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Abstract 
 
The Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (MIP) was created to deal with the euro crisis which 
emerged out of the incomplete structure of the Economic and Monetary Union. This procedure, 
also aimed to prevent future crises, provided the European Commission with the right to control 
certain macroeconomic indicators of its member states and to give policy recommendations in 
the areas of wages, housing and pensions. This is perceived by many as profound meddling in 
national affairs. In a time of rising Euroscepticism and the disappearance of popular permissive 
consensus for European integration the public opinion and the EU’s democratic legitimacy 
become more important. This thesis researches the views of Dutch politicians on the effects of 
the MIP on social economic policy in the Netherlands. It does so by analysing party manifestos 
and ideology of the seven biggest political parties in the Netherlands to come to hypotheses on 
their expected opinions about the MIP, with a special focus on its consequences for several 
social issues. Then empirical evidence is analysed to discover the real opinions of these 
politicians by looking at minutes of debates in the House of Representatives, newspaper articles, 
voting on motions and interviews. When comparing the hypothetical findings with the empirical 
findings, the majority of the researched parties do not support the MIP. This research thus 
reveals the discrepancy between national opinions of Dutch politicians on the MIP and the 
outcome on the European level. This thesis illustrates the poorly organised democratic process 
of discussing European legislative proposals in the Dutch House of Representatives and thereby 
contributes to the discussion about the democratic deficit in the EU.  
 
Keywords: Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure, Dutch national politics, European Union, 
euro area, democratic legitimacy 
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1. Introduction 
 
In order to solve the 2008 financial crisis and later the euro area government debt crisis, multiple 
solutions and innovative European frameworks have been introduced. But the problems the 
European Union (EU) and euro area were facing were not just the result of economic downturn, 
but proved to be intrinsic to the architecture of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The 
euro area was now dealing with the aftermath of the EMU design flaws which have emerged 
during the EMU negotiations dating back to the 1980s.1 The road towards the introduction of 
the EMU was characterized by conflicting opinions on how to integrate, different economic 
priorities, low political commitment, lack of convergence and overall disagreement on how to 
shape the EMU.2 Nevertheless the 1980s were also characterized by newfound support for the 
European case and renewed interest in economic integration caused the EMU project to speed 
forward. Despite the political pressure to complete the Single Market and the EMU, the visions 
on how to form this union greatly varied. 
Some countries believed in the effectiveness of monetarism on integration which held 
that economic convergence would follow once a monetary union was in place. Other member 
states argued that economic convergence, and especially convergence in inflation, was needed 
before fixing the exchange rates.3 The Dutch, who were very much aware of their small and 
open position in the world economy, were in favour of closer European economic and monetary 
cooperation. Furthermore its lack of natural resources resulted in a strong dependence on other 
countries and on trade.4 They followed the Germans in their low inflation targets and 
‘economist’ view on integration, emphasizing macroeconomic integration before the common 
                                                          
1 Maurice Obstfeld, Finance at centre stage: some lessons of the Euro crisis, European Economy, Economic papers 493, 
2013, p. 1 
2 European Commission, One currency for one Europe; The road to the euro, publication 6730, 2006, p. 4 
3 Ivo Maes, Amy Verdun, Small States and the Creation of the EMU: Belgium and the Netherlands, Pace-setters and Gate-
keepers, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 43, No. 2, 2005 
4 Jan Q. Th. Rood, The Position of the Netherlands: A lesson in monetary union, 1990 In Sherman, H. et al. (eds) Monetary 
Implications of the 1992 Process, Pinter/Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1990, pp. 124,125 
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currency.5 Professor André Szasz, former board member of the Dutch Central Bank, stated that 
the true difference between the Dutch view and the monetarist view on monetary integration 
was that “whereas the monetarist meant credit the Dutch meant discipline”6. 
During the EMU negotiations in the 1990s the Dutch have presented themselves as 
active team-players in favour of the EMU, partly because of their aim of opening up markets 
and reducing the costs of trade.7 The Delors Report, which contained the roadmap towards the 
EMU and was chaired by the then President of the European Commission, Jacques Delors, was 
generally accepted by most political parties in the Netherlands. There was consensus on the 
need for the EMU and converged economies.8 Also because it was doubted whether a country 
as small and open as the Netherlands could pursue a real independent monetary policy in the 
first place.9 The Dutch, together with the Germans were also strong advocates of strict 
compliance with the entry criteria fearing that other (southern) member states might return to 
their high levels of public debt and inflation.10 Verdun (political scientist specialised in EU 
politics) goes even further by stating that the introduction of the euro was seen in the 
Netherlands as a result of good policy-making for being such an open trading nation and of its 
close relationship with Germany.11 However, the coming about of the EMU was mostly a 
political process and the economic rationale was sometimes overlooked. Countries like Spain, 
Portugal and Greece which were not ready to join the EMU did so because of political reasons 
and the promise of economic convergence. This was where certain problems the EMU still 
deals with today originated.  
                                                          
5 Amy Verdun, The Netherlands and EMU: A Small Open Economy in Search of Prosperity’, 2002 In Dyson, K. ed., 
European States and the Euro: Europeanization, Variation, and Convergence, Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 1-5  
6 A., Szász, Monetaire Diplomatie; Nederlands Internationale Monetaire Politiek 1958–1987, Leiden, 1988, p. 327 
7 Ibid., pp. 5-11 
8 Jan Q. Th. Rood, The Position of the Netherlands: A lesson in monetary union, 1990 In Sherman, H. et al. (eds) Monetary 
Implications of the 1992 Process, Pinter/Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1990, pp. 144, 145 
9 Ibid, p. 146 
10 Ibid., p. 11,12 
11 Amy Verdun, ‘The Netherlands and EMU: A Small Open Economy in Search of Prosperity’, 2002 In Dyson, K. ed., 
European States and the Euro: Europeanization, Variation, and Convergence, Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 2 
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The euro was thus supposed to bring the economies of the euro area closer together. But 
the euro crisis exposed persistent divergences among the different member states.12 When the 
Maastricht Treaty was adopted many important issues were left undecided due to their political 
gravity and certain competences that should have been dealt with at a European level remained 
national.13 For example the fact that there is no European transfer union complicates the conduct 
of single monetary policy. Schimmelfennig, a renowned political scientist with a specialty in 
European integration, calls this the “uneven integration of macroeconomic policies”14. The EU 
combines a supranational centralized monetary policy with decentralized fiscal policy and not 
nearly enough financial market integration.15 The results of this unfinished EMU became 
apparent in 2008 when the financial crisis transferred into a euro area crisis. Since the 
development of the euro crisis the EU has taken multiple steps to reform its economic and 
monetary governance structure in order to prevent further deepening of the crisis and to provide 
some relief for the economies involved. These objectives were restated in a report named 
‘Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union’, drafted under the supervision of Van 
Rompuy, then president of the European Council.16 This report provided a vision for the future 
and pointed out the need for integrated frameworks in the fields of finance, budgets, economic 
policy and even a political union.17  
The importance of strengthening the ‘economic’ part of the EMU became apparent and 
received more attention. A stricter and more extensive Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) in the 
form of the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (MIP) was one of the first mechanisms 
                                                          
12 Ramunas Vilpisauskas, Eurozone Crisis and European Integration: Functional Spillover, Political Spillback?, European 
Integration, Vol. 35, No. 3, 2013 , p. 362 
13 Ibid.  
14 Frank Schimmelfenning, European Integration in the Euro Crisis: The Limits of Postfunctionalism, Journal of European 
Integration, 36:3, 12-02-2014, p. 323 
15 Ibid.  
16 Van Rompuy, H., Barroso, J.M., Juncker, J.C. and Draghi, M., ‘Towards a genuine economic and monetary union’, 5-12-
2012 available at http://www. consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/134069.pdf accessed at 20-06-2016 
17 Demosthenes Ioannou, Patrick Leblond and Arne Niemann, European integration and the crisis: practice and theory, 
Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 22, No. 2, 2015, p. 157 
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during the crisis to encourage closer economic policy coordination, competitiveness and overall 
convergence. With the MIP a path of more European meddling on several national competences 
was chosen. The crisis showed that Dutch and German fears over fiscal profligacy, expressed 
when negotiating the EMU preconditions, partly became true. The SGP was not respected nor 
complied with and the aim for a balanced government budget needed to be reassured. This 
stricter SGP came in the form of the so called ‘Six Pack’. A package of six legislations aimed 
at strengthening the SGP which shifted the focus from government budgets towards the 
prevention of excessive macroeconomic imbalances. Two of these legislations formed the MIP 
which aimed at converging the European economies and keeping macroeconomic entities in 
check. 18 
This procedure in particular is quite interesting. In order to converge the European 
economies, member states have to keep preselected macroeconomic indicators within certain 
thresholds. These indicators go as far as setting limits for housing prices and wages, next to the 
original goals of keeping government deficit and debt under respectively 3% and 60%. The 
monitoring and corrective arm of this procedure are also fairly intrusive, especially because 
governments are not always able to steer these indicators forcefully. Currently the Netherlands 
are for example experiencing macroeconomic imbalances with respect to their current account, 
private debt, and low wages. These imbalances require monitoring and policy action according 
to the European Commission. This current account surplus is partially traceable to structural 
features of the Dutch economy such as the structure of pensions, wages and taxes. This means 
that keeping the macroeconomic indicators in check can have a big impact on how a country 
                                                          
18 European Council, Conclusions of the European Council on 24 and 25 march 2011, EUCO 10/1/11 REV 1, Brussels, 20-
04-2011, pp. 13-20 available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/120296.pdf accessed 
at: 20-06-2016 
    Augustin Fuera, The European Mechanism for Financial Stability and the Euro-Plus Pact, Lex et Scientia, Vol. 19, Issue 1, 
01 June 2012, pp. 34, 35 
    Köhler-Töglhofer, Walpurga, Part, Macro coordination under the European Semester, Monetary Policy & The Economy, 
No. 4, 2011, pp. 60 – 65 
    Marco Buti, Nicolas Carnot, The EMU Debt Crisis: Early Lessons and Reforms, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 
50, No. 6, 2012 
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organises its economy. Because these indicators are interlinked with many facets of the 
economy, the European guidelines and recommendations to keep the macroeconomic indicators 
between the thresholds affect the sovereignty of member states. Nevertheless these measures 
were found to be necessary to strengthen and finish the original EMU project and equip it with 
better tools to prevent future crises.19 
Despite the strong support of the Dutch government for the creation of the EMU and a 
strict compliance with the SGP rules, today in 2016 the situation has changed. The EMU did 
not quite take on the form the Dutch government ideally wanted and the Netherlands have now 
even become the subject of stronger monitoring and policy recommendations due to its failure 
in meeting the thresholds. Although Dutch political actors understood that being part of a 
monetary union came with certain restrictions, the euro crisis has forced the members of the 
euro area into measures they previously resisted.20 The SGP has grown from monitoring 
government deficit and debt into an all-round prudential monitoring framework where even 
wages and housing prices are under supervision. These social issues are at the heart of politics. 
Member states at the time agreed in favour of the MIP while for example the Dutch government 
knew it could not always influence all the indicators enlisted on the scoreboard due to its 
economic and governance structure. Although this issue is not unique to the Netherlands, it 
remains an interesting case because of their distinctive ‘Polder Model’. The Polder Model 
facilitated the economic revival in the Netherlands in the 1990s, fostering among other things 
low wages and it reduced the costs of the welfare state. It can be defined as a semi-permanent 
dialogue between different actors such as the government but also social partners (tripartism) 
                                                          
19 European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Central Bank 
and the European Economic and Social Committee, Alert Mechanism Report 2016, Brussels, COM(2015)691, 26-11-2015, 
available at: http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/2016/ags2016_alert_mechanism_report.pdf accessed at 13-04-2016 
    Amy Verdun, The Netherlands and EMU: A Small Open Economy in Search of Prosperity, in Kenneth Dyson, European 
States and the Euro: Europeanization, Variation, and Convergence, Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 3-8 
    Ramunas Vilpisauskas, Eurozone Crisis and European integration: Functional Spillover, Political Spillback?, European 
Integration, Vol. 35, No. 3, 2013, pp. 362-364 
20 Amy Verdun, The Netherlands and EMU: A Small Open Economy in Search of Prosperity, in Kenneth Dyson, European 
States and the Euro: Europeanization, Variation, and Convergence, Oxford University Press, 2002 
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like unions and employers organisations which fosters a beneficial atmosphere for both parties 
in which compromises can be made.21 This emphasizes the point that the Dutch government for 
example cannot just set the wages at a level the European Commission requires. Furthermore, 
as discussed before, due to their small and open position in Europe and the world the 
Netherlands have always been in favour of a strong EMU with truly converged economies and 
with strong control on government budgets. This wish for low inflation and sound government 
spending is now once again at the center of attention with the newly enhanced SGP by the 
introduction of the MIP. When the MIP was discussed it is interesting to see whether the Dutch 
government foresaw the effects the MIP was going to have on Dutch socio-economic policy, 
how they viewed these constraints and whether the country is now ‘suffering from a self-
inflicted injury’ by their previous demand for strict control. 
It might be clear that the MIP had a significant impact on Dutch socio-economic policy, 
but the question of how Dutch political parties viewed these consequences rises. Dutch 
politicians have generally been in favour of the EMU, but is this excessive version still being 
supported? When we look at different party positions, the neo-liberal policies of the MIP might 
be conflicting with some party ideologies. It is therefore interesting to see whether initial 
objections to the MIP have disappeared, changed or remained intact. In the range of solutions 
to deal with the euro crisis, the MIP is because of its far reaching EU meddling among the most 
interesting. Especially at a time where Euroscepticism might be more common than Europhilia. 
The MIP reduced national control over major macroeconomic variables which means a 
significant transfer of power towards the EU. In the meantime the scoreboard has already grown 
by four indicators in the last couple of years.22 All done with the necessary fulfillment of the 
EMU in mind. On the one hand there is a movement towards deeper European integration, 
                                                          
21 Ibid., pp. 3-8 
22http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/macroeconomic_imbalance_procedure/mip_scoreboard/index_
en.htm accessed at 11-04-2016 
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supported by political elites on the national and supranational level, while on the other hand the 
European population seems more divided and Eurosceptic than ever. The Eurobarometer from 
spring 2010 showed the first significant change in public trust in the EU.23 For the first time in 
Eurobarometer history the majority of the people, namely 47% distrusted the EU versus 42% 
that did trust the EU.24 The crisis seems to have set in motion a range of Eurosceptic political 
forces.25 These forces are aiming to return to monetary sovereignty for member states and see 
the problems solved by disintegration. This discussion on how to solve the crisis touches the 
essence of politics, namely the redistribution of resources within Europe and the organisation 
of the national economy. This situation has resulted in the fact that the public opinion takes up 
a more prominent place in debates on how to solve the euro crisis. National politicians became 
more obliged to take popular opinion in to account when they meet in EU summits or in council 
formations.26 As political scientist Vilpisauskas stated: “The particular striking feature of recent 
debates and attempts to reform the EU has to do with a disappearance of popular permissive 
consensus for the process of European integration that characterized most of its history”27. The 
increasingly important role of domestic politics emphasizes the importance of looking at 
national governments when analyzing European issues like the MIP. Although many research 
on the MIP and on democratic legitimacy in the EU has been done, previous work has failed to 
map out the national decision-making process of the MIP in a country that has been in favour 
of a strict SGP but is now negatively affected by it. It is thus interesting to see how Dutch 
politicians viewed this procedure and what kind of impact it had on the Netherlands.  
 
                                                          
23 Alina Bargaoanu, Loredana Radu, Elena Negrea-Busuioc, The Rise of Euroscepticism in Times of Crisis. Evidence from 
the 2008–2013 Eurobarometers, Revista Română de Comunicare şi Relaţii Publice, 01 April 2014, Vol. 16(1), p. 10 
24 Eurobarometer 73, Public Opinion in the European Union , Spring 2010, pp. 184-187 available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb73/eb73_vol1_en.pdf accessed at 15-04-2016 
25 Pier Domenico Tortola, Coming Full Circle: The Euro Crisis, Integration Theory and the Future of the EU, The 
International Spectator, 50:2, 2015, p. 130 
26 Ramunas Vilpisauskas, Eurozone Crisis and European integration: Functional Spillover, Political Spillback?, European 
Integration, Vol. 35, No. 3, 2013, pp. 370-372 
27 Ibid., p. 372 
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The research question this paper thus tries to answer is as follows: 
How did Dutch political parties and their politicians view the constraints of the 
Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure on Dutch socio-economic policy? 
 
1.1   Methodology and Relevance 
In order to properly research the question, this thesis will look at the decision-making process 
of the MIP (and therefore also the Six Pack) in the House of Representatives in the Netherlands. 
Since the Six Pack was published in the Official Journal of the EU on the 23rd of November 
2011 the scope of this research will lead up to this moment and starts in 2010 when the proposals 
were first discussed in the House of Representatives in the Netherlands.28 Because the 
discussions about the MIP in the House of Representatives are connected to decision-making 
moments in the EU, the latter will also be included in this thesis.  
To ensure that this research remains orderly only the biggest political parties from the 
then ruling government Rutte-I will be analyzed. These are the political parties that obtained 
ten or more seats in the Dutch House of Representatives after the elections. The elections were 
held on the 9th of June 2010 and the government consisted of a coalition between the 
‘ChristenDemocratisch Appel’ (CDA) or the Christian Democrats (21 seats) and Volkspartij 
voor Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD) or the Liberal Party (31 seats). There was a parliamentary 
support agreement with the Partij Voor de Vrijheid (PVV) which can be considered as the most 
Eurosceptic rightwing party in the Netherlands (24 seats).29 The remaining bigger parties were 
the Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA) or Labor Party (30 seats), the Socialistische Partij (SP) or 
Socialist Party (15 seats), the Democraten 66 (D66) also known as the most outspoken pro-
European party in the Netherlands (10 seats) and finally GroenLinks (GL) or The Greens (10 
                                                          
28European Parliament, Legislative Observatory, available at:  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?reference=2010/0278(COD)&l=en accessed at 30-05-2016 
29 Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal, Deel 1. Kerngegevens. Uitslag van de verkiezingen voor de Tweede Kamer van 9 juni 
2010, Publicatie Kiesraad, 09-07-2010, p. 11 
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seats).30 These seven political parties already reflect a broad scope of both left, right and center 
political parties and hence reflect the scope of Dutch politics and the majority of opinions of 
Dutch citizens well. When this thesis mentions ‘the political parties’ these seven are the ones 
referred to.  
 This thesis consists of qualitative research and the methods used are a combination of 
literature review, interview and process tracing. The choice to combine three research methods 
enhances the credibility and validity of the research. The sources that will be used are both 
primary and secondary. In order to discover how political parties viewed the constraints of the 
MIP on Dutch socio-economic policy this thesis will look at party ideology and election 
manifestos from all the above mentioned political parties. From these manifestos this research 
can determine the view of political parties on different social issues like the labor market, 
housing, pensions, government finances and the party’s stance on Europe in general. Then this 
thesis can draft the hypothetical stance of the parties on the MIP issues. Furthermore, to truly 
discover the opinions of politicians on the MIP and its consequences this thesis will analyze 
empirical evidence in the form of minutes of debates on the Six Pack and MIP in the House of 
Representatives and voting results on motions regarding the MIP. The minutes of these debates 
will illustrate the concerns and opinions of politicians and reflect the political climate around 
this issue. When looking at these minutes we can discover the tone and discourse in which the 
MIP is being discussed. This research will also use newspaper articles since these also contain 
views of politicians on the topic and display a picture of the overall sentiment on the MIP. 
The literature review is complemented with interviews with politicians from the 
abovementioned political parties. Ideally these are the financial spokespersons of the party since 
the financial commission was the leading commission to handle the MIP in the government. 
However sometimes alternatives had to be sought since these politicians are extremely busy.  
                                                          
30 Ibid.  
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I interviewed VVD politician Mark Harbers (Finance), politicians Wouter Koolmees D66 
(Finance), Michiel Servaes PvdA (Foreign Affairs) and GL Finance senior policy officer 
Ewoud Nijhof. This means that this research lacks interviews of the remaining parties. The 
PVV is a closed organisation that is not accessible for any interviews. The other remaining two 
were not able to do interviews due to different reasons. This deficiency is filled with as much 
information from interviews found in quality media and minutes of debates and other texts from 
the Dutch government. The interviews were used to obtain certain inside information about the 
decision-making process and personal views which cannot be found in regular literature. This 
thesis used semi-structured qualitative interviewing because it provides insights in what the 
interviewee finds important and relevant for the research topic. Since the interviews will not be 
coded, there is more space for flexibility in answers and elaborate details. In order to focus the 
interview on answering the research question this thesis used an interview guide with prepared 
questions and topics. This guide provided the basis for each interview but the actual 
conversation was led by what was told by the interviewee therefore none of the interviews are 
similar. The interview guide can be found in Appendix 1 and all the interviews are available 
with the author. In order to get the full picture it is important to combine all these different 
sources. With interviews there is always the pitfall that politicians provide insights with the 
benefit of hind sight. Furthermore, political representatives will always be very nuanced and 
sensitive in their remarks. Subsequently there is always the change of steering the interview 
into certain directions however this has been diminished by the use of the interview guide with 
non-steering questions. The combination of different sources thus helps to surpass these 
difficulties.  
The current social climate around the EU is one of Euroscepticism and debate about its 
democratic legitimacy. This thesis adds to that debate because it is also aimed at capturing the 
discrepancy in the views of national politicians, as elected officials, and the EU level outcome. 
17 
 
The democratic legitimacy or lack of it has always been an important critical note towards the 
EU. Therefore it is important to map the process and gain insights on how these types of 
legislations with major impact are discussed at both the national and European level. To 
relevantly contribute to this discussion this thesis uses process tracing in order to acquire a clear 
and complete overview of the decision making process. Process tracing analyses trajectories of 
change and focuses on the unfolding of events over time.31 It is therefore very useful to get a 
clearer image on the decision-making on the MIP. In order to do this, this thesis provides a 
timeline of all the steps involved on both the EU and national level when discussing the MIP. 
This timeline can be found in appendix 2 and contains a brief description of the process of how 
EU legislations are prepared and discussed in the Dutch House of Representatives. 
 In order to answer this research question this paper is structured as follows. The next 
section will provide an introduction of the euro crisis and the MIP as a solution to the crisis will 
be introduced. Subsequently its constraints on Dutch socio-economic policy will be elaborated. 
In the third chapter the views of Dutch political parties on socio-economic policy and the EU 
will be analyzed according to their party manifestos and ideology. This section will bring forth 
different hypotheses on how the parties are expected to view the researched MIP issues. The 
Fourth section will analyze the empirical evidence as collected from debates, newspaper articles 
and interviews. This section will show the real opinion of politicians according to the MIP 
which can be compared to the hypotheses from the previous chapter. It will hence illustrate the 
differences between party ideology and the party’s actual position on social-economic issues. 
This thesis can thus reveal the discrepancies between the European vote in favour of the MIP 
and its consequences and the views of the political parties on socio-economic policy. The last 
section will compare the hypothetical standpoints with the empirical findings and provides a 
conclusion that will answer the research question.  
                                                          
31 David Collier, Understanding Process Tracing, Political Science and Politics, Vol. 44, No. 4, 2011, p. 823 
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2.   A theoretical framework to understand the euro crisis and its solutions 
 
The euro was introduced to deal with some of the dilemmas that were integral to the creation 
of the single market. The common currency offered a framework for liberalized capital 
movements, dealt with variable exchange rates and created one European monetary policy. 
Although it offered solutions to some issues, the EMU also gave rise to new ones. Since the 
creation of the EMU with the Treaty of Maastricht, many integrative steps have been taken to 
deal with the problems that arose from this incomplete structure. Issues stemming from the 
“mismatch between centralized monetary and decentralized fiscal and financial policies” as 
Niemann and Ioannou stated it.32 This became especially evident with the economic and 
financial crisis that eventually turned into a true euro crisis. The neofunctionalist theory with 
its focus on functional spillover33 is very well suited to explain and understand the ongoing 
process within the EMU towards a deeper integration.34 According to this theory spillover arises 
out of dysfunctions, contradictions and tensions which in turn arise from integration. When 
these tensions are not counterbalanced by more integration they might cause shocks and 
crises.35 The euro crisis can hence be thought of as a consequence of the incomplete EMU 
structure and deeper integration as the solution. During the current euro crisis, too little attention 
was paid to realising true convergence between the European economies, their business cycles 
and other macroeconomic entities.36   
When the EMU was created the project was not functioning at full capacity and the euro 
crisis made its design flaws painfully clear.37 An important theoretical assessment of whether 
countries should join together to form an economic and monetary union is the Optimum 
                                                          
32 Arne Niemann, Demosthenes Ioannou, European economic integration in times of crisis: a case of neofunctionalism, 
Journal of European public Policy, Vol. 22, No. 2, 2015, p. 197 
33 The notion of spillover was added by Lindberg to the neofunctionalist theory and was defined as follows: “Spillover refers 
to a situation in which a given action, related to a specific goal, creates a situation in which the original goal can be assured 
only by taken further actions, which in turn create a further condition and a need for mare actions and so forth.”  
Leon Lindberg, The political Dynamics of European Economic Integration, Stanford University Press and Oxford University 
Press, 1963, p. 10 
34 Arne Niemann, Demosthenes Ioannou, European economic integration in times of crisis: a case of neofunctionalism, 
Journal of European public Policy, Vol. 22, No. 2, 2015, p. 195-198  
    I. Cooper, The Eurocrisis as the revenge of neo-functionalism, EUObserver, 2011 
35 Arne Niemann, Demosthenes Ioannou, European economic integration in times of crisis: a case of neofunctionalism, 
Journal of European public Policy, Vol. 22, No. 2, 2015, p. 198  
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Currency Area (OCA) theory. The theory states that when countries are well equipped with 
adjustment mechanisms to deal with asymmetric shocks they are also fit to be in a currency 
area together. These adjustment mechanisms are high levels of labour movement, price and 
wage flexibility, possible transfers to countries or regions that are adversely affected by certain 
shocks through the common budget and there should be a degree of homogeneity of preferences 
on how to deal with asymmetric shocks.38 The EU however performs poorly on all of these 
requirements and was not and is still not an OCA.39 The launch of the euro was expected to 
trigger adjustments to make the EMU indeed an OCA but this has not been the case.40 
Economist Agnès Bénassy-Quéré stated that the structure of the EMU was created with a couple 
of ideas in mind that proved to be incorrect.41 Firstly one foresaw that macroeconomic shocks 
would be mostly symmetrical which can easily be smoothed over by monetary policy.42 This 
has not been the case. Second, it was expected that financial integration would lead to 
macroeconomic convergence and people had strong believes that the SGP would ensure sound 
government budgets.43 This has also not been the case and divergence was the reality of the 
day.  
The current economic crisis has shown that many of the peripheral countries were, for 
different reasons, unable to comply with the SGP. The crisis led to a division between northern 
creditor member states and southern debtor ones. A division along the same line can be viewed 
in terms of a surplus or deficit on their current accounts. The financial liberalisation which 
accompanied the arrival of the euro, removed several barriers to capital movements throughout 
the EU. This activated the influx of capital towards low-income countries with a high 
investment requirement from the northern member states. The exchange rate risk disappeared 
and the low interest rates for the southern member states backed by the entire euro-system 
resulted there in an abundance of credit and the absence of an incentive to safe.44 These 
imbalances became untenable. Several important scholars (for example Paul Krugman45, Martin 
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Wolf46, Daniel Gros47) see this persistent growth of prolonged macroeconomic imbalances in 
the EU as the cause of the crisis. They suggested that the emphasis of the SGP on only fiscal 
imbalances (i.e. government deficit and debt) to the exclusion of macroeconomic imbalances 
contributed to the problem.48 The focus had thus shifted towards solving macroeconomic 
imbalances. It is hence important to understand what these imbalances are. Wieser, economist 
and now President of the Economic and Financial Committee, defines it as follows: “A 
macroeconomic imbalance is the (negative or positive) position of a domestic, external or 
financial variable… [Which] may – if uncorrected over time – make the national 
savings/investment imbalance so untenable that it self-corrects abruptly, thereby causing 
significant adjustment shocks….”49. It is important that both domestic and external positions 
are taken into consideration, plus Wieser puts emphasis on the financial factors that play a huge 
role within macroeconomic imbalances. What is refreshing about Wieser’s definition and the 
MIP is that both deficits and surpluses, both negative and positive positions are now taken into 
account. This means that countries like Germany and the Netherlands will no longer ‘get away’ 
with their surplus on the current account. This new interpretation of macroeconomic imbalances 
emphasizes the importance of converged and similar economies within a monetary union.  
Deepened economic convergence in the euro area in order to diminish the disturbing 
effects of asymmetric shocks became the generally accepted solution for solving the euro crisis. 
However the consensus was also that just strengthening the SGP would not be enough. Already 
in 2003 the EU’s biggest economies did not comply with the SGP. Both France and Germany 
suffered from debt ratio’s that were too high, however these countries never faced any 
consequences.50 Hence it became apparent that prudential supervision and strict enforceable 
rules would also be needed. In the midst of the crisis the Commission decided to reinforce the 
SGP with the Six-Pack.51 Part of this ‘Six Pack’ was the MIP that was supposed to create better 
supervision on the surpluses and deficits of all EU member states on a collection of 
macroeconomic entities. Its task was to prevent and correct these imbalances within the 
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framework of the newly introduced European Semester.52 The emphasis of the MIP laid on 
catching potentially harmful imbalances at an early stage because they can cause huge detriment 
to the euro area economies and even the EU. These imbalances can for example occur in the 
form of low private savings caused by exaggerated positive future expectations or a bubble in 
certain sectors like housing which are caused by domestic disturbances.53 It is thus less about 
the actual imbalances, and more about the underlying distortions caused by these imbalances, 
stated Blanchard.54 
 
2. 1 The Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure 
The MIP consists of two regulations within the Six Pack, namely Regulation 2011/1174 
‘enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area’ and 
Regulation 2011/1176 ‘prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances’.55 And is thus 
designed to facilitate economic convergence through the surveillance mechanisms that control 
and supervise macroeconomic trends and data in euro countries. It keeps an eye out for 
macroeconomic imbalances (both surpluses and deficits) that cross certain thresholds. It 
strengthens the SGP in such a way that it detects harmful imbalances more early on, so they 
can be corrected on time. Since the MIP has a stronger corrective arm the member states are 
required to remain within the limits set by the MIP. When a country does show imbalances, the 
Commission can propose different recommendations to deal with these imbalances on a 
national level. But when these imbalances are considered to be excessive the country gets 
subjected to in-depth analyses, specific monitoring and eventually might enter the Excessive 
Imbalance Procedure (EIP) which is designed to deal with these imbalances and can eventually 
lead to sanctions when they are not being properly dealt with.56  
 The MIP starts with a scoreboard, synchronised to the European Semester, which shows 
fourteen indicators with different thresholds. The Alert Mechanism Report then decides 
whether an in-depth analysis is necessary to get to the roots of the macroeconomic imbalances. 
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These fourteen headline indicators provide important information about external balances, 
competitiveness positions, labour costs and social adjustment issues. In 2011 the initial 
scoreboard consisted of ten indicators and over the years four have been added, which focused 
mainly on unemployment and financial sector liabilities. Furthermore there are twenty-five 
auxiliary indicators which this thesis will not focus on.57 A complete list of the headline 
indicators can be found in appendix 3. However this thesis focusses on the indicators that will 
have the biggest effect on Dutch socio-economic policy. At the same time these are the 
indicators that will cause the Dutch government the biggest struggle to maintain within the 
thresholds. These indicators are the following three: 
- 3 year backward moving average of the current account balance as percent of GDP, with 
thresholds of +6% and -4%. Because the surplus on the current account can be traced 
back to pension funds and the general structure of Dutch taxes.  
- 3 years percentage change in nominal unit labour cost, with thresholds of +9% for euro 
area countries and +12% for non-euro area countries. Because unit labour costs are not 
just set by the government, but are the result of market forces and the right of unions 
and employer and employee organisations to embark on wage bargaining.  
- Year-on-year changes in house prices relative to a Eurostat consumption deflator, with 
a threshold of 6%. Because housing prices are also a result of market forces and cannot 
be easily adjusted. Furthermore housing booms in the Netherlands continue to rise58 and 
are partly caused by the mortgage interest deduction system which is an important part 
of the Dutch economy.59  
 
The EIP designs an action plan for member states that exceed the thresholds and most 
importantly whose imbalances are systemic, depict underlying disturbances and are damaging 
to their own economy, the euro area or even the EU. The country in question has to state 
concrete measures including a timeline on how to deal with these imbalances. The Commission 
gives recommendations and in cooperation with the Council approves and heavily supervises 
these measures. When a country still does not comply with the rules the Commission can 
impose a fine which can amount to 0.1% of that country’s GDP and must be continuously 
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annually paid until the country in question does comply.60 These sanctions are more automatic 
than in the SGP since they can only be voted against by the use of reversed qualified majority 
voting in the Council of the EU.61 This shows that the MIP and EIP have a significant impact 
on the member states. Furthermore it illustrates that many competences have been transferred 
to the EU level. Surely member states had already given up some sovereignty on their national 
monetary policy with the Maastricht criteria and the common currency, but the MIP and EIP 
take it a big step further.  
 
2.2 The Netherlands and the MIP 
From the moment the MIP was launched The Netherlands have always exceeded certain 
thresholds on different indicators. Table one shows the fourteen macroeconomic indicators and 
the scoreboard for the Netherlands from 2010 until 2014. The data that exceeds the thresholds 
are marked in red. The Netherlands especially experience high surpluses on the current account, 
imbalances on the export market and high private sector debt. This high private sector debt is 
linked to the housing and mortgage markets.  
 
Table 1: Macroeconomic indicators for The Netherlands 
 Time 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Indicators Thresholds      
Current account 
balance - % of 
GDP, 3 years 
average 
+6% to -4% 5.7  7.4 9.1 10.4 10.9 
Net international 
investment 
position - % of 
GDP 
-35% 10.6  19.8 31.1 32.2 60.8 
Export market 
shares - 5 years 
% change 
- 6% -7.1  -7.01 -12.55 -9.97 -11.02 
Nominal unit 
labour cost index - 
3 years % change 
 +9%for euro 
area 
countries  
7.6  4.8 2.3 5.6(p) 5.4(p) 
Real effective 
exchange rates, 
42 trading 
partners – 3 years 
% change 
-/+ 5% for 
euro area 
countries 
-1.5 -2.4 -6.0 0.4 0.8 
Private sector 
debt, 
consolidated - % 
of GDP 
133% 229.4  228.0 229.0 226.6(p) 228.9(p) 
Private sector 
credit flow, 
14% 2.8  3.6 2.1 1.3(p) -1.6(p) 
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consolidated - % 
of GDP 
House price 
index, deflated - 1 
year % change 
6% -2.7  -4 -8 -8.1 -0.5 
General 
government 
sector debt - % 
of GDP 
60% 59.06 61.7 66.4 67.9 68.2 
Unemployment 
rate - 3 years 
average 
10% 4.4  4.8 5.3 6.0 6.8 
Total financial 
sector liabilities, 
nonconsolidated - 
1 year % change 
16.5% 5.8  9.3 5.2 -1.9 (p) 8.2 (p) 
Activity rate (15-
64 years) - % 
point change (t, 
t-3) 
-0.2% -0.3(b) -1.2(b) -0.7 1.2 0.9 
Long-term 
unemployment 
rate - % of active 
population in the 
same age group, 
% point change 
(t, t-3) 
0.5% -0.2(b)  0.4 0.9 1.2 1.3 
Youth 
unemployment 
rate - % of active 
population in the 
same age group, 
% point change 
(t, t-3) 
2% 1.7  1.4 1.5 2.1 2.7 
     
Source: Eurostat Macroeconomic imbalances procedure 62     
B = break in time series, P = provisional 
 
In 2015 there were six countries that needed policy action and monitoring due to their 
macroeconomic situations. These countries were Belgium, Finland, Sweden, Romania, the 
United Kingdom and the Netherlands.63 For these countries an in-depth review was done since 
these imbalances might entailed new or re-emerged risks. In short, in 2015 the Netherlands 
continuously coped with persistent high current account surpluses. These surpluses were caused 
by multiple economic structures such as the way pensions and taxes were organised and they 
depict a source of inefficient allocation of capital.64 The in-depth review had furthermore shown 
that these surpluses have no tendency to fall. The many years of wage moderation and the 
heavily export-oriented production structure in the Netherlands have contributed to this high 
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surplus on the balance of payments.65 These indicators truly characterize the Dutch economy 
and are closely linked to its history and sovereignty. Furthermore the report on the main findings 
of the in-depth reviews on macroeconomic imbalances stated the following on the Netherlands: 
“large multinationals engage in substantial foreign direct investment. As a result, firms often 
need to hedge against the risk that they take abroad and therefore save. The extent of this 
investment explains in part the high propensity to save by corporates. Moreover, in light of a 
highly indebted household sector, deleveraging has also played a role”66.  Thus the high levels 
of private debt entailed risks for economic stability. This had in particular to do with the bubble 
in the housing market but the analysis showed that slowly but securely housing prices were 
corrected and deleveraging is still going on.67 In conclusion, for 2015 the macroeconomic 
imbalances that the Netherlands were experiencing were in need of strict and continuous 
monitoring.  
In 2016 at least 18 countries were in need of an in-depth review from which 12 
experienced imbalances including the Netherlands.68 So the extensive monitoring for the 
Netherlands continued. The in-depth reviews particularly showed that while current account 
deficits in the EU have become more balanced and adjusted, surpluses on the current account 
remained very persistent and showed no improvement in the near future.69 Also house hold debt 
did not show any improvement and contributed to the high current account surplus. Some of 
the indicators remained above or below the thresholds, such as the current account surplus, 
losses in export market shares, private sector debt, and government debt as well as the increase 
in long-term and youth unemployment.70 Due to this information the Commission decided to 
keep the Netherlands under supervision where macroeconomic imbalances will be continuously 
monitored. In the country specific reports it showed that the Dutch economy has recovered from 
the crisis and was  expected to grow by 2% in 2016 and 2017 which will result in rising domestic 
demand for consumers and investors, an even faster growing housing market and increasing 
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wages.71 The Dutch government thus has to monitor whether these indicators will not cross the 
thresholds set by the MIP. Especially the housing market in the Netherlands is a source of 
macroeconomic imbalances due to its high levels of mortgage interest deductibility and high 
loan-to-value ratios. This is also the cause of the significantly high levels of household debt. 
Household deleveraging is also one of the biggest reasons of the increased current account 
surplus. Social housing in the Netherlands is relatively large in comparison to other countries 
which caused inefficiencies in, among other things, the private rental market. To solve these 
issues related to housing, abolishing the mortgage interest deductibility and lowering loan-to-
value rations are recommended by the Commission and should contribute to a decrease of 
household debt and a stronger financial sector. Furthermore the mandatory spending on 
supplementary private pension schemes is high in the Netherlands, which has influenced 
household spending in a pro-cyclical manner.72  
This all shows that the recommendations stemming from the MIP for Dutch socio-
economic policy can be regarded as intrusive. The European Commission for example, 
published a White Paper named ‘An Agenda for Adequate, Safe and Sustainable Pensions’.73  
Due to changing economic and demographic conditions (longer life-expectancy and a smaller 
participation rate) it is ever more important to reform the national pension systems, stated the 
Commission.74  Reform of the pensions and retirement regulation has also become a pressing 
issue in restoring confidence in government finances, which was also mentioned in the 
recommendations stemming from the MIP. To deal with the problems ahead the Commission 
made five pension recommendations in this White Paper. Firstly, it wanted to link the retirement 
age to the increasing life expectancy and secondly it wanted to restrict early retirement schemes. 
The third recommendation supported longer working lives which will be promoted by providing 
better opportunities in the labour market for elderly employees, promoting life-long schooling, 
creating a more diverse workforce and broader participation. Finally, complementary 
retirement savings will be strongly supported as an addition to standard retirement incomes, 
making the pensions more an insurance than part of the standard social security.75  As a result 
pension schemes and labour market practices will be more closely monitored.76 These 
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recommendations deal with issues that make the Dutch economy distinct and touch upon social 
economic issues that frame the Dutch welfare state. Furthermore these issues have previously 
always been real national issues.77 
All these integrative steps to solve the crisis happened in a remarkable quick pace and 
truly deepened EU integration. More competences and political activity has gone to the 
European level and the EU institutions have gained broader jurisdiction over the member states. 
Bauer and Becker go even so far as to call the Commission the winner of the euro crisis due to 
its expanded and deepened role. The Commission is now responsible for extra monitoring of 
public debt, controlling national draft budgets and checking if they are in line with the SGP and 
the MIP, keeping track of macroeconomic imbalances and supervision of the financial sector.78 
The euro crisis has thus been a launch pad for the completion of the EMU.  
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3. Party ideology and manifestos on socio-economic policy and European affairs  
As the previous chapter has shown, the MIP has a potential significant impact on Dutch socio-
economic policy. The European Commission has given recommendations on reforming the 
housing market, the labour market and pensions since these policy areas and the way they are 
structured have distorting effects on the current account and on household debt. Each political 
party however viewed these consequences of the MIP differently according to their party 
ideology, placement on the political left-right scale and general view on European cooperation. 
In order to understand how the Dutch political parties viewed the consequences of the MIP on 
Dutch socio-economic policy it is important to understand the general view of these parties on 
these policy areas and on European affairs. Consequential, from these general statements we 
can form hypotheses about the support of the political parties for the MIP. 
The Macroeconomic Imbalances procedure was discussed in the Dutch House of 
Representatives in 2010 and 2011. Therefore this section will use both general party ideology 
statements and in specific the manifestos from the 2010 elections. The latter are used in order 
to establish their placement on the left-right political scale and their stance on the EU. In order 
to keep this section comprehensive we will look at those issues in the party manifestos that 
reflect the party’s views on wages, the housing market, pensions, general socio-economic 
ideology, government finances and Europe since these policy areas reflect the segments that 
are also the most controversial in the MIP.  
 
3.1 Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD) – Conservative Liberals 
The VVD, as created in 1948, is a liberal party that considers individual freedom to be the 
highest good. From this freedom other liberal principles come forth like responsibility for this 
freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice. These principles embody the ideology of the 
VVD. The Party favours a small and efficient government with sound finances and less 
bureaucracy. This liberal premise is mostly expressed in its strong believe in the free market 
order and the most efficient allocation of capital, labour, goods and services from it. The VVD 
applies the same values on the functioning of Europe.79  
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The VVD 2010 election manifesto expressed that the party wanted to reward 
performances in the labour market by lowering taxes and increasing disposable income. 
Furthermore, due to the fast rise in the life expectancy of citizens the pension obligations faced 
by Dutch citizens will increase significantly. The VVD strives for a stronger pension framework 
by gradually increasing the retirement age and the age of supplementary pensions to 67. Overall 
the party wanted to free markets, including the housing market, of excessive overregulation and 
government interference. However the VVD’s high regard for the free market makes it 
questionable whether the party would agree to restrict housing prices by a European framework 
as proposed by the MIP. 80 In an economic report by the European Commission on the Housing 
market in the Netherlands, Vandevyvere and Zenthöfer have analysed the problems in the Dutch 
housing market and the policy recommendations by the Commission.81 The low taxation and 
high levels of mortgage interest deductibility have resulted in artificially high housing prices in 
the Netherlands which excessively favour high incomes over lower incomes. The VVD as being 
a conservative liberal party, has been in favour of this policy. Nevertheless the subsidies in the 
housing sector impose a great burden on public finances and need to be diminished, claimed 
the Commission. Furthermore the flexible and relatively low cost mortgages with long 
maturities have contributed to significantly high private debt levels in the Netherlands, which 
is one of the areas in which the Netherlands are experiencing imbalances. One of the 
recommendations by the Commission was the complete phasing out of the mortgage interest 
deductibility schemes. While the VVD 2010 election manifesto clearly stated that de party does 
not want to change these schemes.82 
The VVD considered the EU to be of great importance, especially with respect to free 
trade, peace and safety since this will be beneficial for the Netherlands as well. The VVD beliefs 
that the only way to do this is when Europe gives a credible performance by concentrating only 
on its main tasks, namely the internal market, fostering cross-border opportunities and dealing 
with cross-border problems. To restore the European economy and pull Europe out of the crisis 
the VVD considered facilitating the internal market with its free trade the best option and the 
agreements made in the SGP need to be maintained. This also means that government deficit 
and debt need to be controlled. The VVD wanted to realise a healthy and balanced government 
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budget by creating an effective and smaller government.83 Furthermore the VVD wanted to 
make binding agreements at EU level for greater coordination of economic policies so that the 
stability of the euro is maintained. This means that in the eyes of the VVD all Member States 
have to commit themselves to clear targets to reform their labour and pension systems.84  
What this thesis can conclude from these statements is that in general the VVD is 
expected to support the MIP. The party understood that the labour market and pension systems 
needed to be reformed in order to keep it sustainable and they wanted to restore the strength of 
the European Economy. Nevertheless the VVD favoured a small Europe that focusses on 
making the benefits of the internal market as large as possible and the level of interference that 
results from the MIP might be too much in their eyes. The hypothesis is that the VVD overall 
supported the MIP but their biggest concern is expected to be the effects on the housing market 
and the increase in European level regulation on issues where the party might not want to 
transfer more competences towards the EU.  
 
3.2 Partij Voor de Vrijheid (PVV) – far right, Freedom Party 
The Party was founded in 2005 by Geert Wilders, a former VVD Parliamentarian. The PVV 
can be best described as a right-wing radical populist party that embodies many of the recent 
fears expressed in the Dutch society against immigration and the established government.85 
Their standpoints are mainly focused on ethnical issues and social matters. The Party embodies 
both left and right-wing points in their programme, is highly anti Muslim and is very much a 
nationalist party, therefore it does not support the transfer of any competences towards the EU. 
In their 2010 election manifesto ‘Agenda of hope and optimism’ the party called the EU a 
deterioration of the Dutch democracy.86 The party strongly opposed the increasing power of the 
EU and its lack of democratic accountability. The PVV can accept a light form of economic 
and monetary cooperation, keeping to the core activities of the European Economic 
Community, as they stated in their manifesto, but nothing more. They favoured a strong 
compliance with the existing SGP but do not want to enlarge this with the MIP indicators.  
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In the election manifesto the PVV stated that it does not want to increase the pension 
age to 65 and that the party is not willing to compromise on this point. On the housing market 
the PVV favoured more affordable housing and it was against the abolishment of the mortgage 
interest deductibility. To get the government budget in order the PVV favoured a small 
government, meaning less civil servants, less bureaucracy and curtailing provinces and 
municipalities. Also meaning that it will be harder to influence the level of wages through wage-
setting in the public sector. Furthermore the party wanted to ‘get Dutch money back’ from the 
EU budgets. The party is expected to fear a strong diminishing of national sovereignty as a 
result of the MIP. Subsequently the PVV is expected to not agree with the recommendations 
made by the Commission. The hypothesis is that the PVV will completely reject the MIP and 
will only show limited support for a strengthened SGP.87 
 
3.3 Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA) – Labour Party  
The PvdA was founded in 1946 on the ideals of solidarity, cohesion, justice and democracy. 
The ideology of social democracy as translated by the PvdA focuses on the right to a decent 
living for all citizens. In this view of a social society the strongest shoulders should bear the 
heaviest loads and the emancipation of the worker man and other disadvantaged groups is very 
important. This ideology is also wanted for the European project. Integration within Europe 
should, in the eyes of the PvdA, be focused on security policy, fighting cross-border crime and 
terrorism and creating jobs, but the social-democratic aspect needs to be prioritised. The PvdA 
principles manifesto stated: “Promoting the European single market threatens countries and 
parliaments to curtail unnecessary in their ability to regulate the relationship between 
government and market. When large public interests are at stake, such as education, health care 
or social security, this is undesirable”88. This illustrates that the PvdA, although an EU friendly 
party, has some reservations when it comes to the EU and protecting the social security for 
Dutch citizens.89   
In the 2010 election manifesto the PvdA recognised the fact that the Netherlands is 
closely connected to Europe and foreign economies. When sharing a common currency the 
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party understood that every country benefits from sound fiscal policies and thus government 
finances, including the Dutch one, should be in order. Slackness of one country cannot 
jeopardise the prosperity of others. Consequently the manifesto showed that they favour a 
stricter SGP with better sanctions for countries which do not comply. Furthermore the PvdA 
wanted to gradually increase the retirement age and reform the labour market by making it more 
attractive to hire older employees by the use of schooling, wage subsidies and overall better 
working conditions. Furthermore work has to be worth its while and therefor the labour party 
wanted to accommodate lower incomes by giving tax rebates. The limit that the MIP imposes 
on wages thus might conflict with the overall ideology of the party. The PvdA was also 
committed to reform the housing market by making it more affordable, modernising fiscal 
treatments for home owners and making sure that rental places stay affordable for lower 
incomes. It was also in favour of gradually reducing mortgage interest deduction. Their policy 
views on the housing market correspond with their general left party ideology. The hypothesis 
is that the PvdA would in general support the MIP because of their support for stricter European 
finances. However, some of the PvdA positions on social issues are expected to conflict with 
the proposed wage policy. The party does favour a reformed housing market and pension 
scheme and is therefore expected to partly support the MIP.90 
 
3.4 Christen Democratisch Appel (CDA) – Christian Democrats 
The Basic principles of the CDA are founded on a long tradition of Catholic and Protestant 
notions. Key concepts are solidarity, neighbourly love, justice, shared responsibility and 
democracy.91 This shared responsibility for oneself and for each other is fostered by the 
government but is ideally carried by several civil society organisations. The Party thus sees a 
smaller role for the government which will be complemented by these organisations. 
Furthermore the CDA advocates a more austere or sober government than more left-wing 
parties for example do, but is in favour of means-tested taxes and fees.92  
In their 2010 election manifesto the CDA wanted to reform the labour market by 
protecting fragile groups like elderly employees and people without job certainty. In order to 
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deal with the continuously aging population the CDA wanted to foster and increase the 
participation rate to keep the pensions affordable and wanted to gradually increase the 
retirement age to 67. On the pension issue the party is hence expected to agree with the 
European Commission. The party wanted to use spatial planning to solve issues in the housing 
market such as high prices, low flow rates and issues with social rentals where higher incomes 
live in low cost rental houses. Also they supported home ownership and approved the high rates 
of mortgage interest deduction hence it is anticipated that the party will disagree with reforming 
the housing market the way the Commission had envisioned.93  
With regard to international politics the CDA claims to be a pro-European party. They 
view the EU as an engine for internal growth, high levels of welfare and as a safe keeper of the 
socio-economic achievements.94 Nevertheless the CDA is an advocator of less regulatory 
pressure and administrative burdens for citizens and businesses. The party is only in favour of 
European integration when it passes the test for subsidiarity.95 The party also understood that 
in order to restore confidence in the euro, countries with excessive deficits and debt must get 
their government finances in order. This includes the Netherlands. The most important features 
of the SGP in their eyes were also the 60% and 3% norms and the control on these indicators 
needed to be strengthened.96 Furthermore the party favoured a better coordination of national 
economies. However these core indicators of the SGP received priority over other MIP 
indicators, and the improvement of euro area competition is merely a supporting means of 
financial stability.97  
 On first sight the CDA can be viewed as a supporter of the MIP because of its views on 
better economic coordination and strict fiscal policies. However CDA did favour a strong 
examination of subsidiarity on European policy which can conflict with the transfer of 
competences towards the EU.  Due to their high regard for social issues the party is expected to 
disagree on the wage issue and rejects the abolishment of the mortgage interest deductibility. 
Lastly the hypothesis is that the party favours pension reform. Due to the mixed support of the 
MIP and the transfer of competences, the party is expected to partially support the MIP.  
 
                                                          
93 CDA, verkiezingsprogram 2010-2015 slagvaardig en samen, 14-05-2010, pp. 41-43, 75, 76 
94 Ibid., p. 89 
95 Ibid., p. 95 
96 Ibid.  
97 Tweede Kamer, Europese Top, Tweede Kamer stuk 58, 9-03-2011 
34 
 
3.5 Democraten ‘66 (D66) – Social Liberal Party 
The Party dates from 1966 and was founded with the aim to radically democratise the Dutch 
political landscape. D66 supports five main signposts. These are the trust in the power and 
creativity of people and the government should be just there to foster this, secondly striving for 
a harmonized and sustainable society where the degradation of nature is one of the main topics 
of discussion. Thirdly D66 sees international cooperation and economic progress in a European 
framework as the most important way to foster a conflict and war free environment. 
Furthermore they aim to always act and think internationally. Fourth, D66 strives for economic 
independence for everyone and people who achieve greatness must be rewarded, but at the same 
time welfare and prosperity must be shared. Lastly, D66 cherishes the fundamental rights and 
shared values of the Netherlands and wants to safeguard all the freedoms it provides.98 
In their 2010 election manifesto ‘We want it different’ D66 wanted to change the labour 
market into a market where taking responsibility for your own working life is key. D66 wanted 
to motivate people to actively keep learning and growing, making reforms to increase the flow 
within the labour market and realising a higher participation rate. They also strived for a housing 
market where housing remains affordable and suitable for every lifestyle, especially for starters. 
Therefore D66 gradually wanted to diminish the mortgage interest deduction (since this drives 
up the housing prices) and wanted to use spatial planning to create more and diverse housing. 
Furthermore the party was in favour of making the financial system in both Europe and the 
Netherlands more transparent and controllable by enhancing supervision, making banking 
products more transparent and selling state owned banks.99  
When taking all these facets of the party’s ideology in consideration, this thesis’ 
hypothesis is that D66 can be considered as a pro-European party that sees the future of the 
Netherlands entangled with Europe. “What is right for Europe is right for the Netherlands”100 
stated their manifesto. The party is in favour of profound European integration but wanted to 
strengthen the democratic accountability, therefore it wanted to strengthen the influence of the 
European Parliament. Additionally D66 is in favour of strengthening the SGP, making it legally 
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enforceable and enhancing budgetary discipline in Europe. Hence D66 is expected to 
completely support the MIP.  
 
3.6 GroenLinks (GL) – The Greens 
GL was founded in 1990 and was created out of the former pacifist party, a communist party, a 
political radical party and an environmental party. Herman Meijer, one of GL founding fathers, 
stated that the party should voice a strong, well-founded anti-capitalist argument by creating a 
government that is pro-European which should conduct a lenient immigration policy and 
realises a better income equality among its citizens. The word ‘Green’ in GL truly represent its 
high value of the environment and a sustainable economy. GL stands for green and social 
reform.101 
The social left ideology of the party can mostly be found in their envisioned reform of 
the labour market which was stated in their 2010 election manifesto ‘ready for the future’.102  
With lower costs for employers, lower income taxes for people with low incomes, a pension 
age which will be linked to the amount of years one has worked and better dismissal protection 
for weaker employees, the party stands up for the vulnerable people in the Dutch society. This 
left ideology might be at odds with the more liberal MIP, for example on supressing wages. 
The recommended pension reforms by the Commission are expected to be conflicting with the 
GL views since the party was not in favour of raising the retirement age. Furthermore they 
wanted more social housing, diminish the mortgage interest deduction and realise cheaper 
housing for lower incomes. The recommended reform in the housing market in order to 
suppress the housing prices is thus expected to be in line with GL views. Additionally, GL 
favoured investing in times of economic hardship over austerity, especially when it creates more 
jobs and enhances education. Furthermore the government should be able to ask a bigger 
contribution from citizens who earn relatively more money in the eyes of GL. The Party was 
motivated to greatly diminish unemployment by investing more. The party is thus expected to 
agree with the MIP thresholds for unemployment. However, this emphasized need for 
investment in times of economic recession showed a more Keynesian and anti-cyclical 
approach in dealing with the crisis, while the MIP with its low and restricted government 
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spending proves to be more neo-liberal and pro-cyclical. Nevertheless the party understood the 
benefits of strong and solid government finances and wanted to respect and comply with 
international agreements on government finances. GL wanted the EU to have a united and 
strong voice, specifically at international climate summits and favoured a unified and strong 
EU supervision on financial markets. The GL viewpoints on the euro crisis and economic and 
monetary policy in general showed that the party favoured European taxes to strengthen the 
EU’s own resources and they wanted to introduce euro-bonds to stabilise the euro.103 
Overall GL is a pro-European party that is committed to creating a greener and more 
social Europe. The party understood the fact that financially sound and balanced economies are 
beneficial for the entire euro area and that this is a euro area-wide task. Therefore the 
Netherlands too must keep its finances in order and its economy in line with the MIP. There 
can be concluded that GL is expected to support the MIP. Nevertheless the neo-liberal base of 
the procedure will conflict with the more green, social and left approach of the party. Hence the 
hypothesis is that the party will not agree with the indicators on wages and pensions but they 
will agree with reform in the housing market. 
 
 3.7 Socialistische Partij (SP) – Socialist Party 
The Socialist Party was founded in 1972. The SP aims at creating a socialist society where 
people are equal and solidarity for one another is central. The Party strives for an equal 
distribution of welfare and equal opportunities in the Netherlands. The same socialist ideology 
is wanted for Europe and an undemocratic European super state is strongly rejected.104   
For the SP it was clear that the economic crisis was a result of neo-liberal policy making 
and ‘casino-capitalism’.105 Therefore the SP considered it to be unfair to conduct austerity 
measures in the Netherlands at the costs of the average citizen. The SP for example wanted to 
keep the retirement age at 65, did not favour more flexible dismissal regulation and the party 
will not stand for the reduction of unemployment allowances. In times of economic uncertainty 
people are in need of social security, stated the SP. This statement shows that the party is 
consistent with GL on their anti-cyclical views on solving the crisis. Also the mortgage interest 
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deductibility must remain unchanged or even extended according to the SP. The party was 
furthermore clear on its views on the EU, the party favoured cooperation and peace-keeping, 
but seemed to renounce its neo-liberal politics. The party rejected any meddling or intervention 
from the EU in education, healthcare, public transport, housing and social security.106 While 
this thesis has shown that especially in housing and social security the EU meddles quite 
significantly in these policy areas through the MIP.  Therefore the hypothesis is that the SP will 
not support the MIP due to its far reached intervention in these policy areas. This strong 
sentiment against European intervention was also one of the reasons why the SP was against 
the common currency in the 1990s.107 Furthermore in the 2010 election manifesto the SP 
expressed its high regard for unions and the negotiation with social partners on collective labour 
agreements. The SP thus respected the wage bargaining position of these unions and wanted to 
maintain this right to negotiate and bargain. This will impede the lower and repressed wages 
that the MIP demands. It is hence expected that the SP will not support the MIP.108  
In general there appears to be an overall consensus in the Dutch government on the need for a 
strengthened SGP to secure financial stability in the euro area. However each party has its own 
policy area’s on which it rejects the support for the recommended policy changes by the 
Commission stemming from the MIP. Table 2 shows a brief oversight of the seven political 
parties and their views on the main controversial issue of the MIP. The term ‘doubtful’ is chosen 
to express the still unclear position of the party on a certain topic. This will be further researched 
in the coming empirical chapter. Thus far the conclusion is that only D66 is expected to be 
completely in favour of the MIP. Since the party is pro-European and in favour of profound EU 
integration, D66 seems to regard the Dutch and European fate as one. Assuming their 
manifestos and ideologies, the rest of the parties all have different objections to the MIP 
indicators and the effects it will have on Dutch socioeconomic policy. The more right oriented 
parties appear to have more difficulty in uniting their ideas with the suggested reform of the 
housing market and the transfer of competences to the EU. The left oriented parties are expected 
to be in conflict with pension reforms and wage moderation. PVV and SP, despite their different 
party ideologies, can be grouped together due to their high level of Euroscepticism and their 
mutual rejection of transferring competences towards the EU. Judging from party positions on 
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the housing market, pensions, wage policy, and views on Europe in general this research was 
able to categorize the parties as is illustrated in table 2.  
Support of political parties for different MIP indicators 
 
 
 
 
Party: 
In favour of 
strengthening 
the classis SGP. 
(3% and 60% 
thresholds) 
In favour of 
wage 
moderation 
In favour of 
pension reform 
(higher 
retirement age) 
In favour of 
reforming the 
housing market 
(abolish mortgage 
interest deduction) 
Generally in 
favour of 
transferring 
competences 
towards the EU 
Generally 
in favour 
of the 
MIP 
VVD Yes 
 
Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
PVV Yes 
 
No No No No No 
PvdA Yes 
 
No Yes Yes Doubtful  Yes  
CDA Yes 
 
No Yes  No Doubtful Doubtful 
D66 Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
GL Yes 
 
No No Yes Yes Yes 
 
SP Doubtful 
 
No No No No No 
 
 
Table 2: overview of political parties and their views on the MIP consequences 
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4. Empirical politics 
In the previous chapter this thesis investigated whether political parties could hypothetically 
have objections to the MIP according to their party manifestos and overall ideology. The 
conclusion was that only the D66 party, which is known to be pro-European, was expected to 
be completely supportive of the procedure. Every other party investigated in this thesis could 
potentially have objections. However it is also important to analyse the empirical evidence. 
What conclusions can be drawn from debates, motions and opinions from politicians in the 
form of interviews? This chapter will hence look at these components to discover the ‘real’ 
opinion of Dutch political parties about the MIP. Subsequently the empirical evidence can be 
compared with the findings from chapter three. Where the previous chapter was classified by 
party this chapter will be categorised by social-economic issue.  
 
 4.1 Strengthening the classis SGP (3% and 60%) thresholds and the MIP in general 
Former Minister of Finance Jan Kees de Jager of the CDA party, but speaking on behalf of the 
government, stated in a general consultation that the Maastricht Criteria as stated in the SGP 
should be maintained and complied with. The government favoured a strict enforcement of the 
rules with an extra focus on the debt part and not only the deficit part which received more 
attention in the previous years.109 The government stated that it is paramount that budgetary 
discipline must be enforced and all countries must comply, including the Netherlands. When 
analysing debates and interviews it showed that all researched political parties favoured a strict 
compliance with the SGP rules, this was also in line with expectations based on the preceding 
chapter’s analysis of party ideology and manifestos. However these interviews and debates also 
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showed that Dutch politicians still mostly thought in the North-South division in the euro area 
and applied the budgetary constraints mostly to their southern counterparts and not per se to 
their own budgets. The overall sentiment in the House of Representatives seems to have been 
that politicians viewed countries like Greece as the scapegoat of the euro area.110  
Wouter Koolmees (D66) confirmed that the sentiment in the Second Chamber leaned 
towards blaming the southern member states for their lack of competitiveness. The surpluses 
on the current accounts of Germany and the Netherlands were seen as simply successful policy 
of wage moderation and high productivity. Cutting into these surpluses was considered a 
punishment. However, the MIP indicated that the Commission also considered these surpluses 
on the current account a disruptive macroeconomic imbalance. These surpluses lead indirectly 
to the deficits of the southern member states and contributed to the problems the euro area is 
facing, explained Koolmees who advocates a more European sentiment instead of blaming the 
southern member states.111 Along the same lines, the Dutch government was committed to an 
asymmetrical approach to the MIP which means that thresholds for the current account and the 
real effective exchange rate will be exceeded faster in case of a deficit and a worsened 
competitive position.112 The same position can be retrieved from the statements of the PvdA. 
The party blamed southern member states for their lack of fiscal soundness and did not yet see 
the need for northern competitive countries to undergo the same amount of reform under the 
same thresholds. Nebahat Albayrak, former PvdA politician, stated in a debate prior to a 
European Council summit, that the party supported all measures that enhance the financial and 
economic stability of the euro area but that the discussion now also includes countries that are 
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not in the ‘SGP danger zone’. She stated that these countries should not be subjected to the 
same interventions to national sovereignty as countries that are fiscally profligate.113 This is an 
interesting statement because the Netherlands do deal with some persistent imbalances which 
need dealing with according to the Commission. This shows that the debate within the PvdA 
also lingered on a north-south division in Europe and that a surplus on the current account for 
example still was not considered as being problematic while the MIP was designed to tackle 
this specific issue on both ends. These ideas of the southern scapegoat and the punishment of 
the northern countries were predominate in the discussion about the MIP and proved to be not 
conductive to the overall sentiment towards the procedure. However during the interviews with 
the different politicians they all mentioned that their parties understood that the MIP meant that 
the Dutch budgets and surpluses needed to be tackled as well. However this was stated years 
after the first discussions about the MIP and thus might provide a different view on the matter.114 
 Since there was never a real vote on the joint position on the MIP it is problematic to 
assess the actual positions of the different parties. The annotated agenda in preparation of the 
European Council in Brussels on the 24th and 25th of March 2011 contained one of the first 
mentions of a true joined position of the Dutch government on the MIP and the SGP. The letter 
on this annotated agenda stated that “the cabinet is firmly committed to amplify the SGP rules 
and committing themselves to the introduction of a procedure to prevent and correct 
macroeconomic imbalances”115. This letter even stated that the agreement on the MIP was 
reached at the instigation of the Dutch. Furthermore the government repeatedly stated that they 
strongly favour automatic, smart and early sanctions to warn states on time when their 
macroeconomic entities are becoming excessive and to refrain the sanctions from becoming 
                                                          
113 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Europese Top, Tweede Kamer stuk 58, Den Haag, 9-03-2011, p. 37 
114 Ibid.  
115 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, brief van de minister en de staatssecretaris van buitenlandse zaken aan de voorzitter 
van de tweede kamer der Staten-Generaal, kamerstuk 21 501-20 nr. 524, Den Haag, 21-03-2011 
42 
 
arbitrary. The expected reluctance of  Dutch political parties to adopt the MIP as was based on 
the preceding chapter’s analysis of party ideology and manifestos seems diminished in this 
positive joint position, however when individual politicians and parties are researched the 
disinclination on the MIP is still present.116 
In the interview with Mark Harbers, VVD politician and spokesperson financial affairs, 
he explained the position of the VVD on the MIP as follows: “The VVD supported the 
realization of stricter budget rules and the introduction of the MIP. Enforceable fiscal and 
macroeconomic rules are essential for the stability and the preservation of the euro area, in our 
eyes”117. When asked the question whether European political perspectives and positions 
played a bigger role than national ones concerning the MIP, he answered that for his party 
national interests do come first and that the party acts out of Dutch interest. Nevertheless the 
stricter rules on macroeconomic entities are also in Dutch interest because excessive imbalances 
can seriously harm the Dutch economy, stated Harbers.118 He furthermore explained the doubts 
the VVD had about the practicability of the MIP with regard to for example the wages since 
these are partly set by the right of free collective wage bargaining by unions. The party thus 
spoke out in favour of the stricter budget discipline and economic coordination but still showed 
to be reluctant when it came to transferring power to Brussels. 
As was concluded before, the PVV remains a very Eurosceptic party. In 2013 when the 
scoreboard as part of the MIP again was discussed in the European Parliament Auke Zijlstra, 
member of the European Parliament for the Europe of Nations and Freedom Group (from which 
the PVV is a member), stated that the PVV has always expressed its position against the MIP 
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and the Six Pack due to the curtailing of national sovereignty by the procedure.119 Furthermore 
he explained that member states themselves can conclude whether their country faces 
macroeconomic imbalances that need fixing and hence do not need the European Commission. 
Zijlstra also emphasized that countries like the Netherlands and Germany cannot be blamed for 
their strong competitive economies. He stated that countries that do not have their economies 
in order should leave the euro area and do not benefit from a scoreboard.120 Again the North-
South division reared in the debate. The PVV favoured the historical ways of economic 
cooperation for the EU in the form of the European Economic Community, where states still 
had a significant amount of sovereignty, stated former PVV politician Bontes.121 The PVV 
furthermore stated that they were disappointed with the government for not distancing 
themselves from the Van Rompuy plans for stronger economic governance.122 Later in 2012 
the party leader Geert Wilders even advocated a return to the Dutch Guilder and promoted an 
exit from the euro.123 This all serves as yet another example of the party’s disapproval of 
profound European cooperation.  
On the other side of the EU support scale there is D66. Wouter Koolmees, spokesperson 
of financial affairs for this party, explained in the interview that D66 was very much in favour 
of the strengthened SGP by the MIP and the Six Pack in general. The party strongly views that 
when you are in a monetary union together you need a stronger harmonised economic policy. 
Furthermore Koolmees expressed D66’s general support for a more political EU. Besides the 
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necessity for a stronger SGP, he emphasised the amount of freedom states still enjoy when 
conducting policy in tackling these imbalances. Regardless of this supposed freedom for states 
to tackle the imbalances Koolmees did raise some questions on the practicability of this 
procedure. On six October 2011 he filed a motion asking the government to provide some 
insights on which measures a member state can take in order to meet the criteria for 
macroeconomic imbalances.124 The majority of the parties voted in favour on this motion, 
sharing the uncertainty on how feasible the procedure actually is, except for the PVV and SP 
which voted against out of protest towards the entire procedure. D66 fully supported the 
procedure but was at the same time a critical partner in the House of Representatives. Koolmees 
however emphasized in the interview that he does not see a difference between European 
interests and the Dutch interest, these are entangled and their fate is intertwined. This is why 
D66 has always insisted on a stronger SGP. This statement can also be found in minutes of 
several debates in the House of Representatives, where for example former D66 politician 
Gerard Schouw stated that he was very pleased with the efforts of conducting true economic 
politics instead of just monetary cooperation and that he supported the thresholds laid out for 
this economic convergence. Analysing the debates on the MIP also revealed that D66 favoured 
a strict implementation of the measures and an even stricter control on the results with clear 
sanctions. On several occasions party members called their party the camp of the 
‘eurobelievers’, proving the expected party’s overall support for European economic 
governance.125  
The analysis of the party manifestos illustrated that the PvdA is a pro-European party 
that was also critical on several social issues. This view remains when looking at their position 
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in debates. Michiel Servaes from PvdA clarified in the interview that his party has generally 
supported the MIP, nevertheless they always have made remarks on the application and scope 
of the procedure. The politician stated that the party understood that international cooperation 
is about give and take, thus the Netherlands too must comply with the rules and must be willing 
to openly discuss policy choices and listen to the recommendations from the Commission. At 
the same time the party appreciated national sovereignty which must not be compromised, 
especially when it comes to social issues including housing and pensions.126 The PvdA 
resembles in this sense the CDA party. CDA members stated in several debates that their party 
is inherently pro-European and that when it comes to a stricter SGP they supported this matter. 
However both parties and their supporters have an interest in the retaining of national organised 
high standard social issues. CDA was a big advocate of automatic and quick sanctions for 
countries that do not comply with the SGP. To strengthen their argument the party referred to 
the big member states that failed to comply in 2003 and were also not fined. In a debate in the 
House of Representatives Ormel from CDA specifically asked the Prime Minister whether the 
government has realised yet that these sanctions can also affect the Netherlands.127 This shows 
that the sentiment in the Second Chamber was primarily focused on the catch up of the southern 
member states and not on their own macroeconomic position.  
GL senior policy officer on finance Ewoud Nijhof stated in the interview that his party 
has always been mildly critical of the MIP. The fact that the focus has slightly switched to 
dealing with excessive surpluses and not only deficits strikes the party as positive. Furthermore 
Nijhof stated that the party supported economic convergence and can be considered as pro-
European on this matter “even if this means that the Netherlands may have to surrender some 
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control or authority”128. In this interview Nijhof explained that GL felt that many of the 
recommendations given by the Commission to deal with the surplus on the current account did 
not receive enough attention while they certainly were valid, in particular in relation to wages 
and housing. This statement is contradicting the expected view of this left-wing party on wages 
as was predicted in the analysis of party ideology and manifestos. This brief insight shows that 
the party is not substantively against the MIP due to social issues, but the lack of democratic 
legitimacy and parliamentary control appeared to be their biggest issue. The parliamentary 
control on the application of the rules is very limited and GL perceived that political decisions 
were being made with the exclusion of the national and European parliaments, stated Nijhof.129 
This has resulted according to GL to an excessively neo-liberal MIP. These statements show 
that their opposition against the procedure stemmed from a lack of democratic legitimacy and 
not from the predicted conflict between the GL’s left ideology and the MIP’s neo-liberal wage 
suppression and pension reforms. This point that Nijhof has made was however not widely 
discussed in the Dutch parliament. The debates show some mentioning of the urge for open 
communication from the ministers about what was discussed in the Councils back to the House 
of Representatives but the democratic deficiency as such cannot be retrieved from the debates 
as an important topic of discussion. The statements of Nijhof could hence may be made with 
the benefit of hind sight.130 
Lastly the SP voiced an interesting opinion about the MIP. This mainly Eurosceptic 
party stated that only pointing at the southern member states as the ones guilty of the euro crisis 
is unfair and one should also look at the surpluses on the current accounts of the Northern 
countries. Stating that there cannot be a deficit without a surplus. The party understood the 
necessity of a stricter SGP but remained very critical on the MIP with all the extra 
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macroeconomic entities being under European scrutiny. The party feared that the European 
Commission will gain in power and member states have to cede sovereignty. The SP sees 
Europe as a purely economic union which should limit itself to those purely economic issues 
like free trade. In their eyes it should not become a political union nor should it have 
implemented the common currency. Therein they often find an ally in the PVV. Members 
Irrgang (Financial spokesman SP) and Van Bommel (European Affairs SP) have repeatedly 
stated in multiple debates that their party does not support a European economic government 
and that European interference is highly undesirable. When Van Bommel was asked whether 
the party supported the SGP he answered: “We have never been a big supporter of this pact. 
Especially because of the way the big member states (resp. Germany and France) disregarded 
the rules. In our eyes the pact is dead and cannot and should not be brought back to life.”131.132 
This research shows that all parties support the strengthening of the SGP, but the parties 
all did so for different reasons. These reasons ranged from a full support for the EU, to 
safeguarding the national finances or keeping southern member states in line. De Gruyter 
(Dutch correspondent on EU issues for Dutch newspaper NRC Handelsblad) argues that the 
Dutch government would rather get cut themselves by imposing strict rules on the SGP than 
ever having to ask Brussels to be lenient or accommodating towards fiscal rules.133 This position 
can be traced back as far as the EMU negotiations, where the Netherlands also were strong 
advocates of fiscal discipline and punishment for countries that failed to comply.134 While the 
goals may be different, the wanted outcome, namely the strengthened SGP, was unanimous 
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which made the joint position on this matter relatively unambiguous. This was however not the 
case for the researched MIP indicators. Social issues remain at the heart of Dutch politics and 
support for the procedure was divided for each issue according to the left-right position of the 
party and the interest of its constituency.  
4.2 Social issues 
The social issues related to the MIP like wages, pensions, and housing were the source of much 
heated debate in the House of Representatives. As the analysis of the party manifestos has 
shown, all parties had different issues on which they should theoretically object to certain parts 
of the MIP. The politically left parties were expected to object the MIP indicators on wages and 
pensions and the right-wing parties should supposedly have had more objections against the 
recommended housing policy. Therefore the PvdA, CDA and VVD are the most interesting 
cases for this part. On both political extremes there are parties, respectively the PVV and SP, 
which do not fully support European integration and made their objections based on those 
reasons. This part will analyse the empirical evidence on the MIP’s social issues for the different 
parties. 
Especially the meddling of the EU on social issues received a lot of resistance in the 
Chamber. The prevailing opinion for most parties seemed to be that these social issues should 
remain national competences. The PvdA for example was especially critical when it came to 
wage policy. This was also expected due to their ideological heritage of a labour party and their 
high regard of free wage bargaining with social partners. The party repeatedly asked the 
government to explain how far the long arm of the Commission can actually reach. PvdA 
member Albayrak stated clearly that the PvdA rejected the idea that the Commission could have 
influence on the Dutch labour market, on collective bargaining and hence on wages and 
dismissal rights. Furthermore the party did not give the government a mandate for transferring 
wage policy to the European level. They were clear in wanting to keep policy issues such as 
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retirement age, pensions, protection of workers a true national competence. PvdA member 
Servaes mentioned in the interview that the party does take recommendations in the context of 
the MIP very serious since they understood the necessity to engage in deeper economic 
coordination. Servaes stated: “It is important to openly discuss your own policy choices but at 
the same time we value that national competences should not be compromised and should 
remain national, especially when it comes to social issues including housing and pensions”135 
The empirical evidence shows that the PvdA attached more value to preserving the social issues 
as true national competences and showed that the party is more sceptic with regard to the MIP 
than expected.136 
The pension policy reforms appeared to be especially important for the CDA. Pieter 
Omtzigt, financial spokesperson, fought against the meddling of the EU in national pension 
schemes. In an interview with the Dutch news forum NU.nl, Omtzigt stated that the largest 
Dutch savings, namely the pension funds, should remain under control of the Dutch government 
and not Brussels.137 A couple years later he made the same statement again in an interview with 
NOS public broadcasting.138 His mission in this interview was clearly stated: keep Europe away 
from the Dutch pensions. Omtzigt emphasised that for CDA the Dutch pension funds are not 
just insurance companies, they are a crucial part of Dutch social security. Although he did 
recognise that the pensions needed reform, Omtzigt emphasised that these rules should 
definitely not be coming from Europe. Hence the CDA had some difficulty in uniting this view 
with the policy recommendations on pensions from the Commission in an attempt to bring down 
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the surplus on the current account. Another CDA member, Ormel, also explained that his party 
wanted to make sure that the pension issue remained a national competence. They see no harm 
in creating a more level playing field for pensions throughout Europe, but making all pensions 
in Europe uniform cannot be supported by the party, fearing a deterioration of Dutch social 
security and a profound interference of Brussels.139 This is remarkable since the CDA party 
manifesto stated that the party wanted to increase the participation rate to keep the pensions 
affordable and that they were in favour of increasing the retirement age.140 This shows that the 
party is open to reform this policy area however its objections are mostly based on the fact that 
this should remain under national control. 
The VVD was expected to make objections to the proposed changes to the Dutch 
housing market. Especially the elimination of the mortgage interest deduction was an issue 
close to the hearts of the VVD constituency. The VVD 2010 party manifesto has shown that 
the party has a high regard for the free market. Hence it was questionable whether the party 
would agree to restrict housing prices by a European framework as proposed by the MIP. In the 
interview with Harbers, he agreed with this issue and he spoke out against the regulation of the 
housing prices in the buyers-market just for the sake of regulation. In this interview Harbers 
also stated clearly that the VVD does not agree with the recommendations from the Commission 
on the Dutch housing market, mostly because the party does not want to abolish the mortgage 
interest deductibility.141 
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 4.3 Transfer of competences towards the EU 
Support for the MIP in the end comes down to support for the transfer of competences towards 
Brussels. Parties that are generally in favour of European cooperation tend to be less hesitant 
about the MIP since they understand the perceived greater good. GL is an exception to this 
since their objections were based on the democratic underrepresentation of the European and 
national parliaments in the decision-making. It is hence important to analyse the issue of the 
transfer of competences more closely. 
During a general consultation in December 2010 Prime Minister Rutte spoke on behalf 
of the Government and stated that it did not believe in a European economic government. 
However the government did recognise the necessity of economic coordination because of the 
common currency and absence of a political union. Therefore the government supported the 
compliance with the SGP. This statement shows that the government favoured a limited 
cooperation in support of the euro but were reluctant to transfer much authority on economic 
governance to the Commission. Rutte even stated that these discussions may indeed not lead to 
Brussels’ interference in Dutch labour market policy and that countries must remain sovereign 
in these policy areas. Here Rutte for example agreed with the statements from Albayrak from 
the PvdA. Furthermore after the MIP was officially implemented, the government stated in 
2012 in a written consultation in response to a European Council on the future of the EMU that 
the Netherlands will not support the transfer of national competences towards the EU on social-
economic policy areas and taxes.142 Showing its unwillingness to transfer too much power to 
Brussels, while this is something the government has done by approving the MIP.143 
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 Additionally it is remarkable that two months later during a motion from Arie Slob from 
the Christian Union wherein he asked the government to distance themselves from any 
movement towards a political union, believing that the Netherlands should maintain control 
over pensions, taxes and wages, and urging the government to remain committed to a strict 
compliance with the SGP from all member states with suiting sanctions for countries that do 
not comply, the VVD (from which Rutte is the chairman) voted against.144 While the previous 
statements from Rutte logically should have led to a vote in favour of the motion. CDA, D66 
and GL also voted against the motion. Parties that were in favour were the PVV and SP due to 
their Eurosceptic ideology and the PvdA understandably due to its standpoint on wage policy. 
Ewout Irrgang from the SP stated in a general consultation in the House of Representatives 
during the Economic and Financial Council where the MIP was discussed that his party was 
clearly against a European economical government, profound European economic governance 
and the European super state. He spoke up against the perceived misuse of the crisis by the 
European Commission to attract more power in its direction. 145 The SP party hereby reaffirmed 
itself as a Eurosceptic party when it comes to the transfer of competence to Europe. The PvdA 
showed to be more sceptic in this voting than was discovered when analysing their manifest 
and the CDA actually proved to be more in favour than initially thought since the party attached 
a lot of importance to the pension issue. 
Another motion tabled by Plasterk, former spokesperson financial affairs PvdA, in 
March 2011 asked the government to not accept the package to strengthen economic 
governance via the MIP and Six Pack in case it facilitates that measures concerning wages, 
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pensions and taxes can be enforced by the use of fines.146 Only D66 and GL voted against this 
motion showing their support for the measure. All other parties were in favour of this motion 
giving out a clear message that they do not agree with the transfer of enforceable competences 
towards the EU level, especially when noncompliance is finable.147 This motion almost tried to 
give the government an actual mandate on not accepting the MIP if it means that the 
Commission can enforce certain measures in several socio-economic policy areas. There is thus 
a clear discrepancy in the statements by the government that openly supported the MIP (in the 
annotated agenda in preparation of the European Council in Brussels on the 24th and 25th of 
March 2011) and these voting results in the House of Representatives. The MIP however does 
not directly fine countries that reject the recommendations, but the initial aim of the MIP was 
to greatly enforce macroeconomic convergence by keeping the indicators between thresholds. 
When a country does not comply with the latter, they can receive a fine. Most parties however 
did favour enforceable rules and strict compliance of the SGP rules. This discrepancy can be 
placed in the same north-south division as mentioned before. Dutch political parties wanted the 
Southern member states to catch up and follow the rules more strictly, but when it became clear 
that the Netherlands would be subject to the rules as well, the parties no longer seemed to 
support this enhanced transfer of power to the Commission. When analysing all the researched 
data, it can be stated that the Dutch government and House of Representatives did not fully 
support the MIP.  
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5.  Conclusion 
The MIP was adopted by the ordinary legislative procedure and was discussed in the European 
Council. In both Councils the MIP was adopted by unanimity which means that indirectly the 
Dutch government has eventually approved the procedure. Although we cannot determine how 
the debates in both Councils went, since they took place behind closed doors, the thesis has 
shown that there is a discrepancy in the Netherlands between the overall approval of the MIP 
by all the EU member states and the opinions of its national politicians. In order to answer the 
research question ‘How Dutch politicians view the effects of the Macroeconomic Imbalances 
Procedure on social economic policy in the Netherlands?’, this section will compare the 
hypothetical statements from chapter three with the empirical findings from chapter four. In 
order to compare the findings, this thesis uses table three in which H stand for the hypothetical 
statements as retrieved from the manifestos and ideology and E stands for the empirical 
evidence. The slash sign means that this research did not find any specific evidence from which 
a certain position could be concluded. The VVD for example did not really mention the wage 
issue in the debates nor in the interview therefore a real position on this issue based on empirical 
evidence cannot be stated. However since the issue did not play a big role in the party’s 
argumentation it is logical to assume that the VVD did not have any outstanding concerns with 
this specific issue.  
Table 3: support of political parties for different MIP indicators; hypothesis versus empirical evidence. 
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The most striking differences between party ideology, election promises and the statements in 
debates were seen within the PvdA. Where this thesis expected that the party would be in favour 
of the MIP due to its general support of the European case and its willingness to reform pension 
and housing policy, the debates showed a more Eurosceptic side of the party. The reluctance to 
accept policy reforms from the European Commission was the common thread in their 
argumentation. In this research the party appeared to be almost as Eurosceptic as the PVV while 
both parties initially seem to directly oppose each other when it comes to ideology. The PvdA 
however did not reject the MIP out of total rejection of the European case, it did so out of 
protection of the working man. Furthermore the party’s opinion was that the quality and 
organisation of Dutch welfare should remain a national competence. The PvdA wanted strict 
and enforceable compliance with the rules for the southern euro member states, but the party 
was reluctant in accepting the necessary changes (according to the European Commission) to 
get its own macroeconomic entities back in line. This appeared to be true for most parties. This 
thinking in a north-south division with a southern European scapegoat, proved to be 
determinative in the debates throughout the Chamber. This division can even be traced back to 
the monetarist and economist debate back when the EMU was initially formed. Noteworthy is 
the full support of a stricter SGP by all Dutch parties. All parties favoured a strict compliance, 
even the Eurosceptic ones. Which can be interpreted as a general understanding for all parties 
that some form of coordination on finances is important in a monetary union. However this was 
again mostly perceived as necessary for their southern counterparts. 
With regard to the CDA the empirical evidence showed that the party’s biggest problem 
with the MIP was the pension issue. Herein it deviated from the expected stance. The party’s 
strongest arguments were focused on keeping the pensions a national competence and rejecting 
the European interference. Furthermore, its quest for subsidiarity showed the party’s doubts 
towards the MIP. However its support for quick sanctions and strict compliance with SGP, and 
the lack of objections towards wage and housing reform could be interpreted as a general 
support for the MIP. Hence the party is still classified as doubtful for these two areas. 
Furthermore the interview with Nijhof from GL revealed that the true objection of the party 
was the lack of democratic control in the European Parliament and the Dutch parliament. They 
supported the MIP, also on wage policy which deviated from the expected stance based on their 
ideology, but they wanted to decrease the democratic deficit. Subsequently, the SP proved to 
be more in favour of a strengthened SGP than predicted. This party, as one of the few, openly 
stated that the northern surpluses on the current account contributed to the deficits of the south, 
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thereby taking on part of the blame. Which was surprising for an overall Eurosceptic party. 
Lastly, the PVV behaved as was predicted from its manifesto and ideology. The party rejected 
the MIP and any profound form of European coordinated economic governance.  
Table three shows that three out of seven researched parties supported the MIP, from 
which only D66 proved to be completely in favour. The VVD had some doubts on transferring 
competences towards the EU and its biggest issue was the recommended reform of the housing 
market and abolishing the mortgage interest deductibility. CDA was classified as doubtful, and 
the remaining three parties (PVV, SP and PvdA) did not support the procedure. Where the SP 
and PVV did so out of purely Eurosceptic reasons, the PvdA was a more intricate case. In 
conclusion the Dutch House of Representatives did not unanimously support the MIP. The 
Statements from the government however, which consisted of politicians from the VVD and 
CDA, proved to be more in favour of the procedure than compared with statements from other 
politicians. The Ministers of Finance, Economic Affairs and Foreign Affairs and the Prime 
Minister took on a more European stance than the rest of their party members and the remaining 
parties. Thus there was also a discrepancy between the statements and support of the Dutch 
government in comparison to the opinions of the majority of the political parties. This can be 
partly explained by the deeper involvement of the ministers in European decision making. 
These politicians experience external pressures which differs from national politics. But the 
differences in the positions on both sides is remarkable. In the end, the transition of national 
competences in the area of socio-economic policy was the biggest source of objection towards 
the MIP, making it more a discussion of European support and national sovereignty. 
This thesis showed that most Dutch political parties were not in favour of the socio-
economic consequences the MIP would bring. This means that most Dutch citizens probably 
did not support the MIP as well. The procedure to diminish macroeconomic imbalances 
however did came into existence. Because there was no actual voting on a joined position in 
the House of Representatives, the entire decision-making process was difficult to trace. This 
thesis has thus shown that the decision-making process surrounding the MIP in the House of 
Representatives has been a mediocre democratic process. When a democratic process with this 
much impact is poorly traceable it can be stated as undemocratic. The Dutch politicians are not 
able to give their minister a real mandate for its position in Brussels and when the European 
level outcome does not coincide with the positions on the national level not much can be done. 
This procedure is an example of how most important decisions in the EU are being taken by the 
heads of state and illustrates that the control of national parliaments is limited. Striking is the 
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lack of discussion about the democratic deficit in the Dutch House of Representatives. The 
Dutch Prime Minister and ministers had a lot of free play to participate in the debates on the 
European level. This is also necessary because they have to be pragmatic in these European 
level negotiations. They have to deal with other influences and pressures than just national 
politics, namely the positions of all the other member states and the pressure to come to a 
solution. However the striking gap between the position of Dutch politicians and the outcome 
on the European level, namely the existence of the MIP, has been illustrated by this thesis. 
Hence the thesis proves that the discussion about the democratic legitimacy in the EU is still a 
legitimate one and that the democratic deficit is still present.  
The importance of an open democratic system where its citizens are being involved in 
the decision-making is once again made clear. But the discussion about democratic legitimacy 
should not be limited to the EU. This research showed that although most Dutch political parties 
did not agree with the MIP nor with its consequences and European recommendations, the 
national politicians were not able to do much about it. It also shows that the permissive 
consensus on the necessity and importance of European solutions for, among other things, the 
euro crisis is also no longer fully present in Dutch politics. These Dutch politicians saw how 
their ministers came back from Brussels with outcomes that were not in line with their 
preferences. But at the same time they were not able to control whether the reasons and 
arguments concerning the different outcome were valid due to its lack of transparency. Neither 
was the subject of democratic legitimacy an important topic of debate in the House of 
Representatives. Thus, also the national parliaments should take on the responsibility of 
enhancing the democratic legitimacy when it comes to European proposals.  
Lastly, this research makes a case for a federal Europe. The lack of a European treasury, 
euro-bonds and the overall absence of a European government partly led to the crisis situation 
and the absence of quick mechanisms to constrain and solve the euro crisis. A common currency 
without a real political or economic base seems set up for failure. The MIP is also aimed at 
keeping the common currency sustainable and is thus mostly a cosmetic measure. The lack of 
solidarity between member states that this thesis illustrated impedes the proper functioning of 
the euro. A true federal Europe will overcome these issues and will foster the common currency. 
Like Guy Verhofstadt stated in his book ‘Europe’s Disease’, the EU needs a government and 
not just governance.148  
                                                          
148 Guy Verhofstadt, De Ziekte van Europa, De bezige bij, Amsterdam, 2015, p. 230 
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Appendix 1: Interview guide  
Questions concerning the decision-making procedure in the House of Representatives 
1. How do these complicated and multidisciplinary legislative proposals get prepared in 
your political faction?  
- Are experts being heard?  
- Is this been done by spokespersons of your party or by the relevant commission or 
by the Second Chamber as whole in the form of a hearing?  
- Which experts played a role in this specific case? 
 
2. What has been the distribution of roles between the spokes people of Economic 
Affairs, Financial Affairs and European Affairs? 
 
3. What role did the group representation in the European Parliament play? 
 
External factors in the decision-making process 
4. To what extent did the time pressure to find a solution to the European crisis play a 
role in the decision-making? 
 
5. To what extent did the views of the European partners (other countries and 
institutions) play a role in the decision-making? 
 
6. In 2005 the Dutch public voted against the referendum on the European constitution. 
The public opinion on the EU has changed and national sovereignty became more 
important. How did this issue influence the decision-making about the MIP? 
- Is the public opinion becoming more important? 
 
7. To what extent played national political issues a bigger role than the European 
politicial standpoints?  
 
8. To what extent played the short term vision and the re-eligibility of politicians a role 
in the debates about the MIP? 
 
Questions about the socio-economic consequences of the MIP  
9. What was back then the position of your party on the Six Pack and in specific on the 
MIP? 
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10. Did your political group possess enough expertise (intern or externally) to foresee all 
the consequences and implications of such important legislations?  
 
11. Did these implications and consequences play an important role during the MIP 
negotiations and debates? (both within the party/group/commissions and general 
meetings) 
 
12. Looking back on the decision-making process and the current situation, what things 
have gone as expected and what issues turned out different?  
 
- Why did these issues took a different turn than expected? 
 
13. Were there certain implications for the Netherlands that were not anticipated at the 
time?  
 
14. Some of the MIP indicators are very hard for the Dutch government to control or 
influence. Did this issue play a role in the decision-making process and debates about 
the MIP in the House of Representatives?  
-      Go deeper into wages, housing prices and pensions 
 
15. The Netherlands is known as a country that does well when it comes to the 
implementation of European rules and does well when it comes to budgets and 
competition position. But the country now also deals with a persistent surplus on the 
current account which can be traced back to the structure of the Dutch economy 
(pensions, taxes etc.). The European Commission has done several recommendations 
in these policy areas. How did Dutch politicians in the House of Representatives view 
these recommendations?  
 
16. Were the issues as mentioned in question 14 and 15 taken into account in de decision-
making process? 
 
17. Do you think the Dutch government is indeed going to restructure its economy as the 
commission has recommended? 
 
18. How do you and your party view the interference of the European Commission in the 
Dutch economy?   
 
19. Is the European Commission overstepping its boundaries in its meddling in national 
economies via the MIP? 
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20. Was the government at the time aware of the fact that the Netherlands were also 
dealing with excessive imbalances? 
 
21. When the House of Representatives asked for stricter enforcement and more automatic 
sanctions, did they understand that this would have implications of the Netherlands 
too?  
 
Some specific questions on topics relevant for the different parties:  
22. Ask GroenLinks questions on its opinion on the wage, pension and housing indicators 
23. CDA on pensions and on its position as governing party (no interview) 
24. VVD on housing and on its position as governing party 
25. SP on wages, pension and housing and stance on Europe (no interview) 
26. D66 on the need for the MIP in Europe and on ‘motion Koolmees’ 
27. PVV on its stance on Europe and the euro (no interview) 
28. PvdA on wages, pension, housing and stance on Europe  
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Appendix 2: Timeline and procedural overview of the MIP in the EU and House
 of Representatives 
The MIP, as a part of the Six Packs, is based on two pieces of legislation, namely Regulation 
2011/1174 ‘enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro 
area’ and Regulation 2011/1176 ‘prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances’. 
Both of which have been adopted at the EU level by the ordinary legislative procedure. 
Therefore, these Regulations have been adopted by the European Parliament and the Council 
of the EU based on a proposal from the Commission. The Council of the EU is composed of 
representatives of the Member States' governments, in this case the Ministers of Finance, the 
Ministers of Economic Affairs, or at times the Minister of Foreign Affairs played the most 
important roles. Furthermore the MIP was discussed in the European Council. 
The Dutch House of Representatives undertakes a couple of steps to engage in European 
decision making. Every time a Dutch minister goes to a European Council meeting he presents 
the Dutch negotiating position in a letter to the Second Chamber which is called the annotated 
agenda. This agenda will be discussed during a general consultation with the commissions that 
deals with the policy issue in question.149 To get involved in an even earlier stage the 
commission decides at the beginning of the parliamentary year which European proposals will 
be discussed with priority. Some of these proposals will undergo a subsidiarity test and others 
will be placed under a Parliamentary Scrutiny Reservation.  This parliamentary scrutiny is used 
when certain EU proposals have such an important impact on the Netherlands that the 
Government cannot approve it without consulting the Parliament in several debates. This 
procedure indicates that the Chamber considers the proposal to be of ‘exceptional political 
importance’ hence they ask to be thoroughly informed throughout the process before a decision 
                                                          
149 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Brochure: Europese besluitvorming in de Tweede Kamer, mei 2010, p. 2 available 
at: http://www.minbuza.nl/binaries/content/assets/ecer/ecer/import/eu_essentieel/nederlands_parlement_en_de_eu/brochure-
europese-besluitvorming-tweede-kamer accessed at 28-09-2016 
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is reached.150  This Parliamentary scrutiny reservation was also used when the MIP and related 
topics were discussed. This means that the House of Representatives cannot directly vote on 
their position related to the MIP but they can discuss the Dutch position in debates and through 
motions.   
Timeline overview of  the major political proceedings concerning the MIP in the EU and the House 
of Representatives in the Netherlands 
Date Action 
23-04-2010 House of representatives decided which European proposals for the coming year will 
be discussed with priority. The most important proposal regarding the MIP that 
received priority were the strengthening of the SGP and the pension Green Book.151 
27-09-2010 Van Rompuy workgroup discussed two steps of the MIP, namely the preventive arm 
and the corrective arm. There was furthermore discussed whether the Commission 
could use sanctions with the use of reversed qualified majority voting. The minutes as 
reported to the Dutch House of representatives by the then Dutch minister of finance 
Jan Kees de Jager, stated that the Netherlands are positive with regard to the tackling 
of the macroeconomic imbalances and favour the Commission’s positions on this.152  
29-09-2010 
 
European Commission presents the package of six legislative proposals, the so called 
Six Pack, complementary to the outcomes of the Van Rompuy workgroup.153 
07-10-2010 Legislative proposal: Economic governance: prevention and correction of 
macroeconomic imbalances. 'Six pack' published.154  
14-10-2010 Deadline subsidiarity check on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic 
imbalances. The Netherlands did not do the subsidiarity check.155 
25-10-2010 Annotated agenda of the European Council on the 28th and 29th of October in 
Brussels.  
 
The Netherlands acknowledged that economic policy coordination is crucial and 
supported the overall outcome of the Van Rompuy workgroup. However they aimed 
for a more ambitious report and stronger automatic sanctions in the implementation 
of the strengthened SGP.156  
28-10-2010 
29-10-2010 
European Council in Brussels.  
 
“The European Council endorses the report of the Task Force on economic 
governance. Its implementation will allow us to increase fiscal discipline, broaden 
                                                          
150 https://www.houseofrepresentatives.nl/how-parliament-works/europe-house-representatives-and-senate 
151 Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Kamerstuk 22112 nr. 1012, Den Haag, 23-04-2010  
152 Minister van Financiën Jan Kees de Jager, Verslag werkgroep o.l.v. ER-voorzitter Van Rompuy, Ministerie van Financiën, 
BFB10-1098, Den Haag, 04-20-2010 
153 European Commission, Press release EU economic governance: the Commission delivers a comprehensive package of 
legislative measures, IP/10/1199, Brussels, 29-09-2010 
     http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/articles/eu_economic_situation/2010-09-
eu_economic_governance_proposals_en.htm accessed at 28-09-2016 
154http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?reference=2010/0281(COD)&l=en#documentGateway 
accessed at 28-09-2016 
155 http://www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-WEB/dossier/dossier.do?code=COD&year=2010&number=0281&appLng=EN accessed at 
07-11-2016 
156 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Brief van de minister en staatssecretaris van Buitenlandse Zaken, kamerstuk 21 501-
20 nr. 485, Den Haag, 25-10-2010 
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economic surveillance, deepen coordination, and set up a robust framework for crisis 
management and stronger institutions. The European Council calls for a "fast track" 
approach to be followed on the adoption of secondary legislation needed for the 
implementation of many of the recommendations.”157 
02-11-2010 Motion by Braakhuis (GL) on automatic sanctions for countries which do not comply 
with the strengthened SGP. He asked the government to be committed to this notion.  
 
In favour: VVD, PvdA, PVV, D66, GL (and not included in the thesis: CU, SGP, 
PvdD) 
Against: SP 
Motion was adopted.158  
13-12-2010 Annotated agenda of the European Council on the 16th and 17th of December in 
Brussels. 
 
Herein was stated that the Netherlands favoured a strengthened economic policy 
coordination and a strengthening of the SGP as the Commission suggested at the 
previous Van Rompuy workgroup. Prevention of financial and economic crisis is 
essential for the Dutch government and they wished to restore trust in financial 
markets as soon as possible.  
 
With regard to the pension reforms the Netherlands considered it favourable that 
European partners make their pension systems more robust for the future. The 
discussion around pensions included the transition from an apportionment system to a 
funded pension system and whether to include these costs in the government deficit 
and debt or not.  159 
15-12-2010 General consultation of the annotated agenda in the Dutch House of Representatives 
with the permanent Commission of European Affairs and the permanent Commission 
of Foreign Affairs together with the Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs (Mr. 
Rosenthal) and State Secretary (Mr. Knapen).160 
16-12-2010 
 
House of Representatives decided which European proposals for the coming year, 
2011, will be discussed with priority.  
The most important proposal regarding the MIP that received priority were 
strengthened economic governance and the pension white book.161  
16-12-2010 
17-12-2010 
Council of the European Union in Brussels. Focus of the Council lied on financial-
economic matters, among other things the progress on the workgroup Van Rompuy 
and the European Commission for the strengthening of the SGP, pension reforms and 
the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure.162 
18-01-2011 First official debate on Economic governance: prevention and correction of 
macroeconomic imbalances. 'Six pack' in Council.163 
                                                          
157 General Secretariat of the Council, European Council 28 – 29 October 2010 Conclusions, CO EUR 18 CONCL 4, 
Brussels, 30-11-2010 
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497, Den Haag, 15-12-2010 
161 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Kamerstuk 1114 nr. 1012, Den Haag, 16-12-2010 
162 General Secretariat of the Council, Conclusion of the European Council 16-17 December 2010, CO EUR 21, CONCL 5, 
Brussels, 25-01-2011 
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14-02-2011 Second official debate on Economic governance: prevention and correction of 
macroeconomic imbalances. 'Six pack' in Council.164 
17-02-2011 Motion by Slob (Christian Union) asking the government to distance themselves 
from any movement towards a political union, believing that the Netherlands 
should maintain control over pensions, taxes and wages, and urging the 
government to remain committed to a strict compliance with the SGP from all 
member states with suiting sanctions for countries that do not comply. 
 
In favour: PvdA, PVV, SP (and CU, PvdD, SGP) 
Against: VVD, CDA, D66, GL 
Motion was adopted.165 
09-03-2011 Plenary debate in Dutch House of Representatives on the European Council /Euro 
Summit of March 11th 2011.166 
11-03-2011 European Council/ Euro Summit in Brussels. On the agenda were among other things 
the Six Pack, Euro Pact and general Economic convergence and coordination.167 
15-03-2011 ECOFIN Council discussed the general approach on the Six Pack and reached 
agreement on this package to strengthen economic governance. This enabled the start 
of the negotiation with the European Parliament.168 
 
With Jan Kees de Jager (Minister of Finance) as the Dutch representative.  
21-03-2011 Annotated agenda of the European Council on the 24th and 25th of March in Brussels 
is discussed in the House of Representatives.  
 
The position of the cabinet is to be firmly committed to amplify the SGP rules and 
committing themselves to the introduction of a procedure to prevent and correct 
macroeconomic imbalances.169 
23-03-2011 Motion by Plasterk asking the government to not accept the package to 
strengthen economic governance via the MIP and Six Pack in case it facilitates 
that measures concerning wages, pensions and taxes can be enforced by the 
use of fines. 
 
In favour: VVD, PvdA, PVV, CDA, SP (and CU, PvdD, SGP) 
Against: GL, D66 
Motion was adopted.170 
24-03-2011 
25-03-2011 
European Council in Brussels.  
 
European Council discussed the total package to safeguard the economic and 
financial stability in the EU and adopted the Six Pack.171 
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167 European Council, Conclusions of the Heads of State or Government of the Euro Area, 11-03-2011 
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17-05-2011 Third official debate on Economic governance: prevention and correction of 
macroeconomic imbalances. 'Six pack' in Council.172 
20-06-2011 Fourth official debate on Economic governance: prevention and correction of 
macroeconomic imbalances. 'Six pack' in Council.173 
22-06-2011 
23-06-2011 
Plenary session of the European Parliament, held in Brussels.  
Joint debate on Economic Governance.174  
28-09-2011 The European Parliament adopted by 554 votes to 90 with 21 abstentions, a 
legislative resolution on the proposal on the prevention and correction of 
macroeconomic imbalances. 
 
Parliament adopted its position on first reading in accordance with the ordinary 
legislative procedure. The amendments adopted in plenary were the result of a 
compromise negotiated between Parliament and Council.175 
06-10-2011 Motion by Koolmees and Braakhuis on the criteria of the MIP, asking the 
government to provide some insights on the measures a member state can take 
in order to fulfil the criteria for macroeconomic imbalances. 
 
In Favour: VVD, PvdA, CDA, D66, GL, (and CU, SGP) 
Against: PVV, SP (and PvdD) 
Motion was adopted.176 
08-11-2011 Act (Economic governance: prevention and correction of macroeconomic 
imbalances. 'Six pack') adopted by Council after Parliament's 1st reading.177 
23-11-2011 The Six Pack (and hence the MIP) was published in the Official Journal of the 
European Union.178  
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Appendix 3: MIP indicators 
 
The fourteen headline indicators consist of the following macroeconomic areas with their 
corresponding thresholds179: 
 
- 3 year backward moving average of the current account balance as percent of GDP, 
with  thresholds of +6% and -4%  
- Net international investment position as percent of GDP, with a threshold of -35% 
- 5 years percentage change of export market shares measured in values, with a threshold 
of -6% 
- 3 years percentage change in nominal unit labour cost, with thresholds of +9% for euro 
area countries and +12% for non-euro area countries 
- 3 years percentage change of the real effective exchange rates based on HICP/CPI 
deflators, relative to 41 other industrial countries, with thresholds of -/+5% for euro area 
countries and -/+11% for non-euro area countries 
- private sector debt (consolidated) in % of GDP with a threshold of 133% 
- private sector credit flow in % of GDP with a threshold of 14% 
- year-on-year changes in house prices relative to a Eurostat consumption deflator, with 
a threshold of 6% 
- General government sector debt in % of GDP with a threshold of 60% 
- 3-year backward moving average of unemployment rate, with a threshold of 10% 
- Year-on-year changes in total financial sector liabilities, with a threshold of 16.5% 
(added in 2012) 
- 3 years change in p.p. of the activity rate, with a threshold of -0.2% (added in 2015) 
- 3 year change in p.p. of the long-term unemployment rate, with a threshold of +0.5% 
(added in 2015) 
- 3 year change in p.p. of the youth unemployment rate, with a threshold of +2% (added 
in 2015) 
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